银行危机救助策略的分析

发布时间：2018-06-16 12:22

  本文选题：银行危机 + 货币危机　； 参考：《国际金融研究》2011年03期

【摘要】：银行危机的救助策略一直是理论界关注的焦点。本文通过构建一个两期模型,以银行危机是否会引发货币危机为评判标准,探讨政府在面对商业银行清偿能力危机时救助与不救助的抉择。经研究发现:当商业银行的不良资产率高,或商业银行在经济中起重要作用,抑或产出的价格弹性较小时,为了避免货币危机的发生,政府应该出手对商业银行提供救助。在相反的情况时,固定汇率制度下,政府为了维护其固定汇率的信誉应该出手对商业银行提供救助;浮动或管理浮动汇率制度下,考虑到商业银行的道德风险问题,政府应该不予以救助。
[Abstract]:The rescue strategy of bank crisis has always been the focus of attention in the theoretical circle. Based on a two-phase model, this paper discusses the choice between the government's rescue and non-rescue in the face of the commercial bank's solvency crisis, based on the criterion of whether the banking crisis will lead to the currency crisis. It is found that when the non-performing assets rate of commercial banks is high, or commercial banks play an important role in the economy, or the price elasticity of output is small, in order to avoid the occurrence of currency crisis, the government should provide assistance to commercial banks. On the contrary, under a fixed exchange rate regime, governments should, in order to maintain the credibility of their fixed exchange rates, provide relief to commercial banks; under floating or floating exchange rate regimes, taking into account the moral hazard of commercial banks, The government should not give aid.
【作者单位】： 南开大学国际经济研究所;天津城市建设学院;
【分类号】：F831.1
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本文编号：2026649