大股东机会主义与定向增发折价——兼析制度变迁的影响

发布时间：2018-06-17 10:49

本文选题：定向增发 + 大股东机会主义　；参考：《上海财经大学学报》2011年04期

【摘要】：我国上市公司定向增发时发行价格相对于市场价格普遍存在较高的折扣率,大股东机会主义是造成定向增发高折扣率的重要原因。文章通过对上市公司定向增发定价过程的分解,以定向增发基准日前20个交易日股价累积超额收益率和发行价与基准价之比直接度量大股东的机会主义行为,并检验其对增发折扣率的影响。本文的研究发现:上市公司存在向大股东进行低价增发的事实,在基准价格确定以后,大股东可以通过调整发行价与基准价之比来实施其机会主义行为,从而达到攫取上市公司和其他股东利益的目的。而在询价机制引入后,大股东的机会主义行为得到了有效遏制。
[Abstract]:There is generally a high discount rate between the issuing price and the market price of the listed companies in China, and the opportunism of large shareholders is the important reason for the high discount rate. Based on the decomposition of the pricing process of listed companies, this paper directly measures the opportunistic behavior of large shareholders by using the cumulative excess return rate of stock price and the ratio of issue price to benchmark price in the 20 trading days prior to the benchmark day. And test its effect on discount rate. The research of this paper finds that the listed company has the fact that the listed company carries on the low price increase to the big shareholder, after the benchmark price is determined, the large shareholder can carry out its opportunism behavior by adjusting the ratio of the issue price to the benchmark price. In order to achieve the purpose of seizing the interests of listed companies and other shareholders. After the introduction of inquiry mechanism, the opportunistic behavior of major shareholders has been effectively contained.
【作者单位】：上海财经大学金融学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(70803027,70873080,71073100) 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-07-0533) 上海市哲学社会科学规划项目(2008BJB003) 上海市重点学科建设项目(B802) 上海财经大学“211工程”三期重点学科建设项目资助
【分类号】：F224;F832.51

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