累积投票制度的实施动机和实施效果研究

发布时间：2018-09-06 19:10

【摘要】：我国的资本市场自发展以来,直接投票制在各项涉及上市公司的重要决议上得到了广泛的应用,但是直接投票制不利于中小股东对自身诉求的表达,为大股东侵害中小股东利益提供了可能。在这样的背景下,为了保护我国上市公司的中小股东的权益,我国证监会于2002年出台规定并引入了累积投票制,规定控股股东持股比例在30%以上的公司应当采用累积投票制度,而控股股东持股比例低于30%的公司则拥有自主决定投票制度的权利。目前国内外对于累积投票制度的研究大多集中在法律设立和制度制定的层面,广泛探讨的话题包括累积投票制度的起源史,累积投票制发展和转变进程、对累积投票制应当采用强制主义还是许可主义、累积投票制度的正面影响和负面效应以及累积投票制度的改进建议等。对于累积投票制度实施的动机和效果方面的实证研究较少,那么对于证监会没有强制规定的上市公司,也就是控股股东比例在30%以下的公司,是否也有自愿采用累积投票制的?是什么样的动机促使这些公司采用累积投票制?对于被强制采用累积投票制、自愿采用累积投票制以及未采用累积投票制的三类公司,采用了累积投票制度的公司是否有明显的董事变动?其中代表大股东意志的董事席位占比是否有变化?采用累积投票制对于大股东占款是否有影响?这些问题的答案,不仅有助于理解累积投票制度的实施动机和实施效果,而且对于市场中未采用累积投票制度的公司、市场的监管者以及其他市场参与者提供一定的参考和借鉴。结合我国累积投票制度实施的实际情况,本文采用实证研究的方法,梳理了2001年至2011年期间的A股主板上市公司,将研究对象公司划分为三类：强制采用累积投票制度、自愿采用累积投票制度以及未采用累积投票制度。首先对2001年至2011年间自愿采用累积投票制度和未采用累积投票制度的公司进行研究,选取相应的财务指标和公司治理指标,构建逻辑回归模型,考察公司自愿采用累积投票制度的影响因素,研究自愿采用累积投票制度的动机。然后本文选取2003年至2011年作为研究区间,分别从董事变更、大股东董事席位占比、大股东占款三个维度研究累积投票制度的实施效果,以采用累积投票制度作为解释变量,构建线性回归模型,并进一步考察自愿采用累积投票制度和强制采用累积投票制度的公司在采用累积投票制度后的实际影响。本文的研究结果表明,增长率较高、控股股东持股比例较高的公司更有动机采用累积投票制度。采用累积投票制度在提高董事会成员变动幅度、降低大股东侵占方面没有显著作用,采用累积投票制度对降低大股东董事席位比例能够起到一定作用。
[Abstract]:Since the development of China's capital market, direct voting system has been widely used in various important resolutions involving listed companies, but direct voting system is not conducive to the expression of minority shareholders' demands. It provides the possibility for the large shareholders to infringe on the interests of the minority shareholders. In this context, in order to protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders of listed companies in China, the CSRC introduced a cumulative voting system in 2002, which stipulates that companies with controlling shareholders holding more than 30% should adopt the cumulative voting system. Companies with controlling shareholders holding less than 30% have the right to vote on their own. At present, most of the researches on the cumulative voting system at home and abroad focus on the establishment of laws and the establishment of the system. The topics widely discussed include the history of the origin of the cumulative voting system, the development and transformation process of the cumulative voting system. Whether the cumulative voting system should be compulsory or permissive, the positive and negative effects of the cumulative voting system and the suggestions for improvement of the cumulative voting system should be adopted. There are few empirical studies on the motivation and effect of the implementation of the cumulative voting system, so is there any voluntary use of the cumulative voting system for listed companies, that is, the proportion of controlling shareholders below 30%, which are not mandatory by the CSRC? What motivates these companies to adopt a cumulative voting system? For the three categories of companies which are forced to adopt the cumulative voting system, which voluntarily adopt the cumulative voting system and which do not adopt the cumulative voting system, are there any significant changes in the directors of the companies which have adopted the cumulative voting system? Is there a change in the percentage of directors representing the will of major shareholders? Does the cumulative voting system have an impact on large shareholders? The answers to these questions not only help to understand the motivation and effectiveness of the cumulative voting system, but also for companies in the market that do not use the cumulative voting system. Market regulators and other market participants to provide a certain reference and reference. Combined with the actual situation of the implementation of the cumulative voting system in China, this paper uses the method of empirical research to comb the A-share main Board listed companies from 2001 to 2011, and divides the research object companies into three categories: mandatory adoption of the cumulative voting system. The cumulative voting system is adopted voluntarily and the cumulative voting system is not adopted. First of all, the paper studies the companies that voluntarily adopt the cumulative voting system and those companies that do not adopt the cumulative voting system from 2001 to 2011, select the corresponding financial indicators and corporate governance indicators, and construct a logical regression model. The influence factors of voluntary adoption of cumulative voting system were investigated and the motivation of voluntary adoption of cumulative voting system was studied. Then this paper selects 2003 to 2011 as the research interval, respectively from the three dimensions of directors change, the proportion of the directors of the majority shareholders, the majority shareholders to study the implementation of the cumulative voting system, using the cumulative voting system as an explanatory variable. The linear regression model is constructed, and the actual influence of the cumulative voting system on the companies that voluntarily adopt the cumulative voting system and compulsorily adopt the cumulative voting system is investigated. The results show that the companies with higher growth rate and higher shareholding ratio of controlling shareholders have more incentive to adopt the cumulative voting system. The adoption of cumulative voting system does not play a significant role in increasing the change rate of board members and reducing the encroachment of large shareholders. The adoption of cumulative voting system can play a certain role in reducing the proportion of directors' seats of large shareholders.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.5

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