金融控股集团道德风险问题研究——基于侵害债权人利益的视角

发布时间：2018-10-29 08:56

【摘要】：金融危机中,综合经营金融机构的道德风险问题已引起社会公众和监管当局的重点关注。金融控股集团由于存在财务杠杆过高、风险属性不一和组织结构复杂等特点,在信息不对称机制作用下,其产生的道德风险甚为突出。金融控股集团通过资产转移,将高风险资产全部安排于一个独立的高风险子公司,在盈利状态时,努力使自身利益最大化,在亏损状态时便违约,风险损失则最终由债权人承担,以此通过在集团成员机构内不同资产安排来榨取全部或部分债权人的利益。从榨取债权人利益角度看,金融控股集团道德风险有三种不同的生成机制,并且存在柠檬效应。其效应与金融控股集团的有效供给的资产规模、预期回报率的相对大小和债权市场定价机制的完善程度等因素相关。
[Abstract]:In the financial crisis, the moral hazard of comprehensive management of financial institutions has attracted the attention of the public and regulatory authorities. Due to the existence of high financial leverage, different risk attributes and complex organizational structure, the financial holding group has a prominent moral hazard under the action of asymmetric information mechanism. Through the transfer of assets, the financial holding group arranges all the high-risk assets in an independent high-risk subsidiary. When it is profitable, it strives to maximize its own interests, and defaults when it is in a loss-making state. The risk loss is ultimately borne by the creditors, thereby squeezing all or part of the creditors' interests through different asset arrangements within the group member institutions. From the angle of squeezing the interests of creditors, the moral hazard of financial holding group has three different generating mechanisms and lemon effect. The effect is related to the scale of the effective supply assets, the relative size of the expected rate of return and the perfection of the pricing mechanism in the creditor's market.
【作者单位】：华东理工大学商学院/金融工程研究所;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金“混业经营下金融风险的演化机理及其有效监管——基于风险与效率均衡的视角”(70803010) 教育部人文社会科学基金“混业经营下金融风险的传递机制及其有效监管”(07JA790072)
【分类号】：F832.3;F224

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