银行信贷中第三方监督创新研究——以资产管理公司为例

发布时间：2018-11-29 09:28

【摘要】：本文针对我国传统的银行信贷业务中资产管理公司被动收购不良资产的问题,设计银行—企业—资产管理公司的三方契约,资产管理公司参与并监督企业信贷,能够降低企业信贷中的道德风险问题。通过对企业自有资金与银行可提供资金对于投资、银行与资产管理公司收益的分析,发现企业的自有资金以及企业主是否尽职决定了企业自身的融资能力。在投资项目固定不变的情况下,只有自有资金充足的企业可以直接得到银行的融资,自有资金不够充足的企业,需要通过银行—资产管理公司—企业的三方契约来获得融资,在企业的融资过程中需要接受资产管理公司的监督。同时银行与资产管理公司收益受到累计企业自有资金数量与累计银行信贷资金数量的影响。
[Abstract]:In view of the problem of passive acquisition of non-performing assets by asset management companies in the traditional bank credit business in China, this paper designs a tripartite contract between banks, enterprises and asset management companies, in which asset management companies participate in and supervise corporate credit. Can reduce the moral hazard problem in the enterprise credit. Through the analysis of the income of the investment, bank and asset management company, it is found that the enterprise's own capital and the owner's due diligence determine the financing ability of the enterprise itself by the analysis of the enterprise's own capital and the funds which can be provided by the bank to the investment, the bank and the asset management company. In the case of fixed investment projects, only enterprises with sufficient own funds can be directly financed by banks, and enterprises with insufficient own funds need to be financed through a tripartite contract between banks and asset management companies. In the financing process of the enterprise need to accept the supervision of the asset management company. At the same time, the income of banks and asset management companies is affected by the accumulative amount of enterprise's own capital and the amount of accumulated bank's credit funds.
【作者单位】：南开大学公司治理研究中心;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重大项目“完善国有控股金融机构公司治理研究”(10zd&035) 教育郎人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“董事会结构、机制及其评价研究”(08JJD630007)
【分类号】：F832.39

【共引文献】