高管团队异质人力资本激励机制研究
发布时间：2018-08-12 09:22
【摘要】：本文分析了公司高管团队异质人力资本的特殊性,根据这些特殊性基于博弈论视角分析高管团队异质人力资本与物质资本的博弈过程,博弈结果表明:(1)随股权的不断分散,现代公众公司实质上已成为拥有异质人力资本的高管团队与物质资本拥有者所形成的"不完全契约",无论物质资本所有者拥有多大的剩余索取权与控制权,都少不了异质人力资本所有者对公司生产经营的直接控制。(2)动态博弈表明,对经营管理团队进行"他者"监督,精炼贝叶斯均衡不可能达到,此时,给予异质人力资本所有者剩余分享权以提高其自我监督的积极性是必要的。(3)拥有异质人力资本的高管团队对公司的所有权主要体现在剩余价值索取权,该权利可以用薪酬水平来衡量。
[Abstract]:This paper analyzes the particularity of the heterogeneous human capital of the company's executive team. According to these particularities, the game process between the heterogeneous human capital and the material capital of the executive team is analyzed based on the game theory. The game results show that: (1) with the continuous dispersion of equity, In fact, modern public companies have become the "incomplete contract" between the executive team with heterogeneous human capital and the owners of physical capital, no matter how much residual claim and control rights the owners of physical capital have. (2) the dynamic game shows that the "other" supervision of the management team can not be achieved by refining Bayesian equilibrium. It is necessary to give surplus share right to the owners of heterogeneous human capital in order to improve their enthusiasm of self-supervision. (3) the ownership of the company by the executive team with heterogeneous human capital is mainly reflected in the claim of surplus value. This right can be measured by the level of pay.
【作者单位】： 滁州学院;四川大学经济学院;
【分类号】：C931
本文编号：2178626
[Abstract]:This paper analyzes the particularity of the heterogeneous human capital of the company's executive team. According to these particularities, the game process between the heterogeneous human capital and the material capital of the executive team is analyzed based on the game theory. The game results show that: (1) with the continuous dispersion of equity, In fact, modern public companies have become the "incomplete contract" between the executive team with heterogeneous human capital and the owners of physical capital, no matter how much residual claim and control rights the owners of physical capital have. (2) the dynamic game shows that the "other" supervision of the management team can not be achieved by refining Bayesian equilibrium. It is necessary to give surplus share right to the owners of heterogeneous human capital in order to improve their enthusiasm of self-supervision. (3) the ownership of the company by the executive team with heterogeneous human capital is mainly reflected in the claim of surplus value. This right can be measured by the level of pay.
【作者单位】： 滁州学院;四川大学经济学院;
【分类号】：C931
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