低碳供应链纵向减排合作下的政府补贴策略

发布时间：2017-12-28 14:08

本文关键词：低碳供应链纵向减排合作下的政府补贴策略　出处：《运筹与管理》2014年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：为了研究低碳供应链减排合作的政府补贴问题,分别构建了在纳什博弈、斯塔克尔伯格博弈和供应链集中决策三种不同的博弈关系下,政府对制造商和零售商合作减排投入进行补贴的博弈模型。分析了企业的最优减排成本投入和政府的最优补贴率,并进一步讨论了政府补贴行为和企业选择减排合作行为之间的互动博弈。研究显示:政府提供的减排补贴和企业的收益随着供应链上下游合作的紧密程度不同而不同,在纳什博弈下最高,在集中决策下最低,斯塔克尔伯格博弈下介于两者之间。比较了力量不对等供应链中企业分别处于领导者和跟随者时获得的政府补贴的差异。同时在政府补贴行为和供应链企业合作行为的交互博弈中,政府的最优策略是不对任何一方实行减排补贴。
[Abstract]:In order to government subsidies for low carbon emission reduction of supply chain cooperation, respectively established the centralized decision in three different game in the Nash game, the Stackelberg game and supply chain cooperation, government subsidies and emission reduction investment game model of the manufacturer and the retailer. The optimal emission reduction cost and the optimal subsidy rate of the government are analyzed, and the interactive game between the government subsidy behavior and the enterprises' choice of emission reduction cooperation is further discussed. Research shows that: the government provides subsidies for emissions reductions and profits with the close degree of cooperation downstream of the supply chain is different, the highest in the Nash game, the lowest under centralized decision-making, Stackelberg game somewhere in between. The difference between the government subsidies obtained by the leaders and followers in the unequal supply chain is compared. At the same time, in the interactive game between the government subsidies and the cooperative behavior of the supply chain enterprises, the best strategy of the government is to do no subsidies to any party.
【作者单位】：天津大学管理与经济学部;内蒙古大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70771073,71072155) 内蒙古大学高层次人才科研启动项目(135144)
【分类号】：F224.32;F274
【正文快照】： 0引言将环境保护和可持续发展纳入工业和商业发展过程中必须认真考量的因素已成为社会和公共权力的共识,政府会采用各种规制促使企业朝着低碳化的方向发展,规制的变化本质上来说是将碳排放的外部成本内部化,尽量解决环境的外部性问题。碳减排的经济学本质也是外部性问题。一部

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