考虑公平因素的不同主导模式下闭环供应链的决策与协调

发布时间：2018-01-22 17:40

本文关键词： 闭环供应链主导模式公平偏好努力水平定价决策　出处：《天津大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：闭环供应链的运作实现了废旧品回收和循环再利用,为越来越多的企业所采纳。企业会积极投入回收努力和销售努力,以促进回收再制造和产品销售。在市场需求与价格、回收努力和销售努力相关的情况下,企业的定价和努力水平决定着闭环供应链的绩效。考虑到渠道主导模式、节点企业是否具有公平偏好以及公平偏好的程度也对闭环供应链的绩效有重要影响,本文旨在探究节点企业公平中性和具有公平偏好两种情形下,具不同主导模式的闭环供应链的决策和协调问题。本文主要进行了如下研究:1.公平中性下具不同主导模式的闭环供应链的决策与协调。针对由一个公平中性的制造商和一个公平中性的零售商组成的闭环供应链,利用博弈论得出了集中决策和制造商主导、权力对等、零售商主导下分散决策模型的最优定价、努力水平决策和利润,进行对比分析并提出了低价促销协调契约,随后进行算例研究。研究表明:主导权向零售商转移总是有利于零售商,也并非一直对制造商不利。分散决策时闭环供应链最优的主导模式与回收努力的需求扩张效应相关。当此效应较低时,权力对等模式下闭环供应链绩效最优;反之零售商主导模式最优。低价促销契约可以有效协调闭环供应链。2.公平偏好下具不同主导模式的闭环供应链的决策与协调。在由一个具公平偏好的制造商和一个具公平偏好的零售商组成的闭环供应链中,利用博弈论探究了不同主导模式和低价促销契约下闭环供应链的决策和利润,进行均衡解分析和算例研究。研究发现:相比公平中性的情形,公平偏好(优势成员的同情心理和劣势成员的嫉妒心理)会使分配结果趋向公平,其中同情心理对劣势成员利润和效用的提升作用更大,嫉妒心理对优势成员利润和效用的降低作用更明显。同情心理的增强有利于闭环供应链绩效的提升,实现高利润和效用下的分配公平;嫉妒心理的增强则不然。通过合理设定渠道费用,公平偏好下低价促销协调契约同样有效。因此,企业不应一味追求主导地位,应积极投入回收努力或销售努力、达成协作契约,实现共赢。优势企业应提高自身的同情心理,以减小弱势企业嫉妒心理的增强对自身和闭环供应链的不利影响,加强合作关系,提升整体绩效。
[Abstract]:The operation of closed-loop supply chain realizes recycling and recycling of waste goods, which is adopted by more and more enterprises. Enterprises will actively invest in recycling efforts and sales efforts. To facilitate recycling and remanufacturing and product sales. Where market demand is related to price, recycling efforts and sales efforts. The pricing and effort level of enterprises determine the performance of closed-loop supply chain. Considering the channel-dominated mode, whether the node enterprises have fair preference and the degree of fair preference also have an important impact on the performance of closed-loop supply chain. The purpose of this paper is to explore the neutral and fair preference of nodal enterprises. Decision making and coordination of closed-loop supply chain with different dominant modes. 1.Decision-making and coordination of closed-loop supply chain with different dominant modes under fair neutrality, aiming at a closed-loop supply chain composed of a fair neutral manufacturer and a fair neutral retailer. By using game theory, we get the optimal pricing, effort level decision and profit of centralized decision, manufacturer-led, power-equal and retailer-led decentralized decision model. This paper makes a comparative analysis and puts forward the coordination contract of low price promotion, and then carries out a case study. The study shows that the transfer of dominant power to retailers is always beneficial to retailers. The dominant mode of closed-loop supply chain in decentralized decision is related to the demand expansion effect of recycling effort. When this effect is low, the closed-loop supply chain performance is optimal under power equivalence mode. On the contrary, the retailer-dominated model is optimal. The low-price promotion contract can effectively coordinate the decision-making and coordination of the closed-loop supply chain with different dominant modes under fair preference. In the case of a manufacturer with a fair preference. And a retailer with a fair preference in a closed-loop supply chain. By using game theory, this paper explores the decision-making and profit of closed-loop supply chain under different dominant modes and low price promotion contracts, and analyzes the equilibrium solution of the closed-loop supply chain. Fair preference (the sympathy of superior members and jealousy of inferior members) will make the distribution result tend to be fair, among which compassion will play a more important role in the promotion of profit and utility of inferior members. The effect of jealousy on the profit and utility of superior members is more obvious. The enhancement of sympathy is beneficial to the improvement of closed-loop supply chain performance and the realization of fair distribution under high profit and utility. The enhancement of jealousy is not. Through reasonable setting of channel cost, the coordination contract of low price promotion under fair preference is also effective. Therefore, enterprises should not blindly pursue the leading position. We should actively invest in recycling efforts or sales efforts to reach a cooperative contract to achieve win-win situation. The superior enterprises should improve their sympathy psychology. In order to reduce the adverse effects of the envious psychology of the weak enterprises on themselves and the closed-loop supply chain, strengthen the cooperative relationship and improve the overall performance.
【学位授予单位】：天津大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274

【参考文献】