零售商竞争下考虑产品商誉的纵向联合促销微分博弈
发布时间:2018-02-16 12:20
本文关键词: 竞争 产品商誉 促销努力 微分博弈 成本分担契约 出处:《控制与决策》2017年12期 论文类型:期刊论文
【摘要】:将产品商誉作为状态变量,借助微分博弈研究由单个制造商和两个竞争性零售商组成的供应链纵向联合促销问题.在产品需求受商誉和零售商促销努力的共同影响下,分别构建集中式和分散式微分博弈模型,引入成本分担契约对供应链进行协调,并通过算例对相关参数进行灵敏度分析.研究表明:成本分担契约的引入可提高零售商促销努力水平、产品商誉以及需求量,实现供应链协调;随着零售商竞争程度以及促销努力成本系数的增加,引入契约后供应链成员的利润增加值呈下降趋势;相反,随着零售商促销努力以及产品商誉对需求影响程度的增加,供应链成员的利润增加值呈上升趋势.
[Abstract]:Taking the product goodwill as the state variable, this paper studies the vertical joint promotion problem of the supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and two competitive retailers by means of differential game. Under the influence of the goodwill and the retailer's promotion efforts, the product demand is affected together. The centralized and decentralized differential game models are constructed, and the cost sharing contract is introduced to coordinate the supply chain. The research shows that the introduction of cost sharing contract can improve the level of retailers' promotion efforts, product goodwill and demand, and achieve supply chain coordination; With the increase of retailers' competition and the cost coefficient of promotional efforts, the profit increase of supply chain members shows a downward trend after the introduction of contracts; on the contrary, with the increase of retailers' promotion efforts and the impact of product goodwill on demand, The profit increase of supply chain members is on the rise.
【作者单位】: 北京科技大学东凌经济管理学院;
【基金】:国家自然科学基金项目(71172169)
【分类号】:F224.32;F274
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本文编号:1515502
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