基于废钢回收再生产的闭环供应链决策模型及激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-02-26 09:37

  本文关键词： 闭环供应链 政府约束 委托—代理 道德风险 激励机制　出处：《浙江工业大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：近年来,我国钢铁产业高速发展,作为资源高消耗型的钢铁生产企业,降低成本、保护环境、提高资源利用率和市场竞争力,实现经济的良性循环已经成为急需解决的问题。另外,相比国际平均水平和发达国家,中国的废钢再生产比率有较大的差距,政府应该激励钢铁企业进行废钢回收再生产,节约能耗,提高环保,加快社会可持续发展进程。因此,研究废钢回收再生产的闭环供应链模型及激励机制问题,对改善我国钢铁产业现状和深化可持续发展战略都具有非常重要的理论价值和实际意义。本文研究了政府、钢铁生产商、销售商和第三方回收商之间的决策制定、废钢回收渠道选择以及生产商和销售商的委托—代理激励机制问题。主要的研究内容有：政府宏观约束情况下基于废钢回收再生产的闭环供应链决策问题。设计了政府对生产商奖惩函数,同时考虑了生产商内部回收生产废钢和废钢回收方的回收努力,分别建立了基于生产商外部回收、销售商回收和第三方回收商回收三种模式下的闭环供应链决策模型。通过比较三种回收模型的最优策略中废钢回收率和参与成员收益,对废钢最优回收渠道进行选择,并分析了政府奖惩机制对回收率、收益和价格的影响。废钢回收再生产闭环供应链中线性分成制激励契约设计问题。考虑生产商同时使用铁矿石和废钢进行钢铁生产情况,在生产商和销售商之间建立多任务委托—代理下的线性分成制激励契约模型,比较分析信息对称和信息不对称两种环境下相关参数对生产商激励系数、生产商收益及代理成本的影响。本文主要运用了Stackelberg理论模型,委托—代理理论和运筹学线性规划方法来研究决策模型和激励机制。研究结果如下：当销售商负责废钢回收时,废钢回收再生产率和生产商收益最大；生产商收益和废钢回收再生产率与生产商的总体单位节约成本、政府单位奖惩因子呈正相关,与政府规定的废钢最低回收率呈负相关；进行含有道德风险的多任务委托—代理时,生产商期望收益和激励系数分别和努力成本系数、市场的不确定因素、销售商风险规避因子呈负相关,代理成本则相反；一般情况下,随销售商风险规避因子增加,生产商应提高钢铁销售激励系数,降低废钢回收激励系数；生产商对于努力成本系数和市场不确定性较小活动的激励程度应大于努力成本系数和市场不确定性较大的激励程度。基于实际,以上结论为我国废钢闭环供应链管理的实施和改善提供参考建议。
[Abstract]:In recent years, China's iron and steel industry has developed at a high speed. As an iron and steel producer with high consumption of resources, it reduces costs, protects the environment, and improves the utilization of resources and market competitiveness. In addition, compared with the international average level and the developed countries, there is a big gap between China's scrap production rate, the government should encourage iron and steel enterprises to carry out scrap recycling and reproduction. Therefore, the closed-loop supply chain model and incentive mechanism for scrap recovery and reproduction are studied. It is of great theoretical value and practical significance to improve the present situation of China's iron and steel industry and to deepen the strategy of sustainable development. This paper studies the decision making between the government, the steel producer, the seller and the third party recycler. The selection of scrap recovery channels and the principal-agent incentive mechanism of producers and sellers. The main research contents are as follows: the closed-loop supply chain decision problem based on scrap recycling reproduction under the government macro constraints. The government rewards and punishes producers, At the same time, considering the recovery efforts of internal producers and scrap recyclers, respectively, based on the manufacturer's external recycling, The closed-loop supply chain decision-making model under the three models of vendor recovery and third-party recycler recovery. By comparing the scrap recovery rate and the income of the participating members in the optimal strategy of the three recovery models, the optimal recycling channel of scrap steel is selected. The effect of government reward and punishment mechanism on recovery rate, income and price, linear share incentive contract design in the closed-loop supply chain of scrap recovery reproduction is analyzed, and the production of iron and steel using iron ore and scrap steel is considered. A linear split incentive contract model based on multi-task principal-agent is established between the manufacturer and the seller, and the incentive coefficients of the manufacturer under the information symmetry and information asymmetry are compared and analyzed. This paper mainly uses Stackelberg model, principal-agent theory and operational research linear programming method to study the decision model and incentive mechanism. The results are as follows: when the seller is in charge of scrap recovery, The recovery and reproductivity of scrap steel and the profit of the producer are the biggest, and the profit of the producer and the recycling rate of scrap are positively correlated with the total cost saving per unit of the producer, and negatively correlated with the minimum recovery rate of scrap steel as stipulated by the government, and the reward and punishment factor of the government unit is positive correlation. When the multi-task principal-agent with moral hazard is carried out, the producer's expected income and incentive coefficient are negatively correlated with the effort cost coefficient, the uncertain factors of the market and the risk aversion factor of the seller, but the agency cost is opposite. In general, with the increase of risk aversion factor, the manufacturer should increase the incentive coefficient of steel sales and reduce the incentive coefficient of scrap recovery. The incentive degree of the manufacturer for the effort cost coefficient and the small market uncertainty should be greater than that for the effort cost coefficient and the market uncertainty. The above conclusions provide reference suggestions for the implementation and improvement of scrap closed-loop supply chain management in China.
【学位授予单位】：浙江工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F426.31;F274
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本文编号：1537471