商品粮三级单供应链利益补偿协调机制研究
发布时间:2018-03-03 08:00
本文选题:商品粮供应链 切入点:利益补偿 出处:《黑龙江八一农垦大学》2014年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:粮食安全问题一直是国内研究的焦点问题。基于粮食供应链管理方法,研究粮食供应链上粮食生产和经营主体的利益补偿协调机制,提高粮食供应链整体竞争优势,对稳定粮食生产与构建粮食安全保障体系具有重要理论和实践意义。以黑龙江省粮食主产区为背景,分析商品粮供应链上主体的利益关系,并选择三级商品粮供应链为研究对象,构建出商品粮供应链微观组织结构模型,为利益补偿协调机制构建提供组织载体;首先,针对该供应链中以加工企业为核心,粮食生产者为供应商的利益关系,按照Stackelberg博弈理论,研究得出一种风险共担的带有罚金的协调契约,据此得出结论:粮食生产者不能履约带来的额外集货成本会损害供应链整体利益,但政府补贴会使得粮食生产者的风险共担能力变大;而粮食生产者自主从原粮现货市场中集货,可以帮助加工企业分担粮源不稳定风险,作为补偿也从企业获得比现货市场高的契约价格。其次,针对商品粮三级单供应链进行研究,其中加工企业为核心,粮食生产者为供应商,而经销商为加工企业销售商。粮食生产者与粮食加工企业之间选择带有罚金的风险共担契约,其有两种形式,一是粮食生产者接受罚金,二是粮食生产者自主集货;而按照粮食加工企业与经销商之间是否选择收入共享协调契约,也可以形成两种形式,一是选择普通批发价契约进行交易,二是选择在批发价基础上构建收入共享契约。因此,在商品粮三级单供应链中可以形成四种契约组合,并且通过对四种契约组合的最优订购量及利润进行分析,得出粮食经销商的最优订购量主要受到成品粮市场销售价格和自身成本的影响,并且当粮食加工企业集货成本较小时,,可选择粮食生产者接受罚金与收入共享组合契约;反之,选择粮食生产者自主集货与收入共享组合契约。研究商品粮三级单供应链利益补偿协调,可以有效指导粮食加工与生产,粮食加工企业与外省经销商的协调可以有效促进黑龙江省粮食的对外销售。
[Abstract]:Food security has always been the focus of domestic research. Based on the method of grain supply chain management, the interest compensation coordination mechanism of grain production and management in grain supply chain is studied to improve the overall competitive advantage of grain supply chain. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to stabilize grain production and build food security system. Taking the main grain production area of Heilongjiang Province as the background, this paper analyzes the interest relationship of the main body in the commodity grain supply chain. And choose the three-level commodity grain supply chain as the research object, construct the commodity grain supply chain micro-organization structure model, provide the organization carrier for the benefit compensation coordination mechanism construction; first, aiming at the processing enterprise as the core in the supply chain, According to the Stackelberg game theory, a kind of coordination contract with penalty is obtained, which is based on the Stackelberg game theory. The conclusion is as follows: the additional aggregate cost brought by the failure of grain producers to perform will harm the whole benefit of supply chain, but the government subsidy will increase the risk sharing capacity of grain producers; And grain producers can collect goods independently from the original grain spot market, which can help processing enterprises share the risk of food instability, and as compensation, they can also obtain higher contract prices from the enterprises than from the spot market. Secondly, According to the research of the three-stage single supply chain of commodity grain, in which the processing enterprise is the core, the grain producer is the supplier, and the distributor is the seller of the processing enterprise, the grain producer and the grain processing enterprise choose the risk sharing contract with fine. There are two forms, one is that grain producers accept fines, the other is that grain producers collect goods on their own; and according to whether grain processing enterprises and distributors choose a coordination contract for income sharing, two forms can also be formed. One is to choose the ordinary wholesale price contract for transaction, the other is to choose to build the income sharing contract on the basis of wholesale price. Therefore, four kinds of contract combinations can be formed in the three-stage single supply chain of commodity grain. And through the analysis of the optimal order quantity and profit of the four kinds of contract combination, it is concluded that the optimal order quantity of grain distributor is mainly affected by the market selling price of finished grain and its own cost, and when the cost of assembling grain processing enterprise is small, Grain producers can choose to accept the combination contract of fine and income sharing; on the other hand, choose the combination contract of independent collection and income sharing of grain producers. It can effectively guide grain processing and production, and the coordination between grain processing enterprises and distributors in other provinces can effectively promote the external sales of grain in Heilongjiang Province.
【学位授予单位】:黑龙江八一农垦大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F326.11;F326.6
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