基于碳排放权交易与多政府干预的跨区域绿色供应链协调效率与公平研究

发布时间：2018-03-10 23:42

本文选题：跨区域绿色供应链　切入点：碳排放权交易　出处：《浙江工商大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着全球经济的不断发展,温室气体的排放已经成为环境气候恶化的罪魁祸首,为控制温室气体排放、减缓气候变化,保证社会资源消耗和环境负作用最小,我国政府承诺2020年单位GDP能耗相对2005年下降40%-45%。在碳减排既定目标下,绿色供应链成为当前供应链管理者关注的话题,但由于供应链中的上下游企业往往分布于不同的区域,考虑跨区域不同地方政府差异性管制策略,关于碳排放权交易对减排效率及区域间公平的研究较少。本文考虑地方政府差异性管制策略,在以往的研究成果与实践基础上,基于碳排放权交易的跨区域绿色供应链协调效率与公平,主要内容包括:(1)企业自主减排情形下跨区域绿色供应链协调研究。针对无碳排放限制与企业间无碳排放权交易的情形,分析了产品价格及单位产品碳减排率对供应链上下游企业生产与自主碳减排决策的影响,基于Stackelberg博弈构建了分散式与集中式企业自主减排绿色供应链协调模型,通过对比分析,结论表明产品价格弹性系数、单位产品碳减排弹性系数对供应链企业收益有明显影响,且供应链企业在完全合作时供应链的收益和单位产品碳减排率都优于分散式供应链的收益和碳减排率。(2)碳排放权限制情形下跨区域绿色供应链协调研究。针对有碳排放权限制及存在企业间碳排放权交易情形,分析了产品价格、单位产品碳排放量及碳交易价格对供应链上下游企业生产与非自主碳减排决策的影响,基于Stackelberg博弈构建了分散式与集中式企业非自主减排下绿色供应链协调模型,通过对比分析,结论表明产品价格弹性系数、单位产品碳减排弹性系数、政府联合制定的碳交易价格及政府惩罚因子对供应链企业收益有明显影响,且集中式策略中企业收益及碳减排弹性系数、政府惩罚力度对碳减排有明显的影响,且供应链企业在完全合作时供应链的收益和单位产品碳减排量都要优于分散式供应链的收益和碳减排量。(3)多政府参与下有碳排放权限制与交易的跨区域绿色供应链公平研究。针对有碳排放权限制及存在企业间碳排放权交易情形,考虑跨区域绿色供应链各地方政府差异性管制策略的公平问题,以各企业所得碳排放权配额的不公平性最小为目标,分析了产品价格、单位产品碳排放量、碳交易价格及碳排放权配额对供应链上下游企业生产与非自主碳减排决策的影响,基于Stackelberg博弈与二层规划理论,构建了分散式与集中式跨区域绿色供应链协调模型,通过对比分析,结论表明产品价格弹性系数、单位产品碳减排弹性系数、碳排放权配额对供应链企业收益及企业间公平有明显影响。
[Abstract]:With the continuous development of the global economy, greenhouse gas emissions have become the chief culprit of environmental climate deterioration. In order to control greenhouse gas emissions, mitigate climate change and ensure the minimum consumption of social resources and negative effects on the environment, Our government has promised to reduce the energy consumption per unit GDP in 2020 by 40% to 45% compared with 2005. Under the target of carbon emission reduction, green supply chain has become a topic of concern for current supply chain managers, but the upstream and downstream enterprises in supply chain are often distributed in different regions. Considering the different regulatory strategies of different local governments across regions, there are few studies on the efficiency of carbon emissions trading and interregional fairness. This paper considers the different regulatory strategies of local governments, on the basis of previous research results and practices. The coordination efficiency and fairness of cross-regional green supply chain based on carbon emissions trading, including the coordination of cross-regional green supply chain under the circumstance of enterprises' autonomous emission reduction. This paper analyzes the influence of product price and carbon emission reduction rate per unit product on production and decision making of independent carbon reduction in upstream and downstream enterprises of supply chain. Based on Stackelberg game, the coordination model of decentralized and centralized enterprises' green supply chain with independent emission reduction is constructed. The conclusion shows that the price elasticity coefficient and carbon abatement elasticity coefficient of unit product have obvious influence on the profit of supply chain enterprise. Moreover, the profit of supply chain and the carbon emission reduction rate per unit product of supply chain are better than those of decentralized supply chain in the case of complete cooperation. The coordination of cross-regional green supply chain is studied under the condition of carbon emission right restriction. The limitation of carbon emission rights and the existence of trading of carbon emission rights among enterprises, The effects of product price, carbon emissions per unit product and carbon trading price on the production of upstream and downstream enterprises in supply chain and the decision of involuntary carbon reduction are analyzed. Based on Stackelberg game, the green supply chain coordination model of decentralized and centralized enterprises under involuntary emission reduction is constructed. Through comparative analysis, it is concluded that the price elasticity coefficient and carbon reduction elasticity coefficient per unit product are obtained. The carbon trading price and the government penalty factor made jointly by the government have obvious influence on the profit of the supply chain enterprise, and the enterprise income and the elasticity coefficient of carbon emission reduction in the centralized strategy, the intensity of the government punishment has obvious influence on the carbon emission reduction. And when the supply chain enterprises cooperate fully, the profit of the supply chain and the carbon emission reduction per unit product are better than those of the decentralized supply chain and the carbon abatement amount. (3) under the multi-government participation, the trans-regional green supply with carbon emission right restriction and trading is better than that of the decentralized supply chain. Research on chain Equity. With regard to carbon emission rights restrictions and the existence of inter-firm carbon emissions trading, Considering the fairness of different control strategies of different local governments in cross-regional green supply chain, aiming at the minimum unfairness of carbon emission right quota earned by enterprises, this paper analyzes the product price and carbon emissions per unit product. The effect of carbon trading price and carbon emission right quota on the production and non-autonomous carbon emission reduction decision of upstream and downstream enterprises in supply chain is discussed. Based on Stackelberg game and bilevel programming theory, a decentralized and centralized cross-regional green supply chain coordination model is constructed. Through comparative analysis, the conclusion shows that the price elasticity coefficient, carbon abatement elasticity coefficient of unit product and carbon emission right quota have obvious influence on the profit of supply chain enterprises and the equity among enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：浙江工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：X196;F274

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