基于双寡头零售商的供应链质量信息披露问题研究

发布时间：2018-03-11 16:18

本文选题：信息披露　切入点：供应链　出处：《北京外国语大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：本文研究双渠道供应链的信息披露策略问题,为此建立双渠道供应链模型。供应链包含一个供应商、两个零售商,最初只有供应商掌握产品质量信息,而零售商进行商品销售并具有定价权。本文引入的两个模型为:1)零售商斯塔克尔伯格双寡头博弈模型,2)零售商古诺双寡头博弈模型。通常,制造商要么直接披露质量信息,独自承担披露成本;要么联合零售商一起披露,并分担披露成本。我们的研究揭示出临界信息披露质量与制造商、零售商承担的披露成本之间的关系。事后披露时,制造商、零售商通常根据他们的披露成本和产品质量来制定披露策略。研究发现,零售价格可能随着披露成本上升而降低,在产品质量较低时,制造商通过承担更多的披露责任而获利。本文也研究了在事前披露时供应链各方的利润情况,发现双渠道条件下制造商直接披露对制造商来说可能是最优的,联合披露对制造商和零售商都有好处。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the information disclosure strategy of double channel supply chain, and establishes a model of double channel supply chain. Supply chain consists of one supplier, two retailers, and at first only supplier has product quality information. The two models introduced in this paper are: 1) retailer Stackelberg duopoly game model 2) retailer Cournot duopoly game model. Usually, manufacturers either directly disclose quality information. Our research reveals the relationship between the critical disclosure quality and the disclosure costs borne by the manufacturer, the retailer. Retailers usually make disclosure strategies based on their disclosure costs and product quality. The study found that retail prices may fall as disclosure costs rise, and when product quality is low, This paper also studies the profit of the parties in the supply chain when the disclosure is made in advance, and finds that the direct disclosure of the manufacturer may be optimal for the manufacturer under the condition of double channels. Joint disclosure is good for both manufacturers and retailers.
【学位授予单位】：北京外国语大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274;F724.2

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