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多渠道供应链定价策略——基于强势制造商为零售商提供网络渠道指导价格视角

发布时间:2018-03-11 16:45

  本文选题:多渠道 切入点:促销努力 出处:《中国流通经济》2017年06期  论文类型:期刊论文


【摘要】:现实中很多商品都在通过多渠道销售,但多渠道销售尽管能够提高供应链灵活性,也会带来渠道冲突,而价格则是导致渠道冲突的重要因素。对于同时开通网络渠道的单个制造商和单个零售商所组成的供应链系统,考虑零售商实体渠道促销努力水平和消费者搭便车行为,在以制造商为主导的斯坦克尔伯格博弈下,依照制造商是否提供零售商网络渠道指导价格,研究各渠道定价策略可以发现,制造商最优利润与促销努力水平和搭便车消费者所占比重正相关;零售商存在最佳促销努力水平,其最优利润与搭便车消费者比重负相关;批发价格较低时,零售商能够接受制造商提供指导价格;制造商网络渠道基本市场份额较大时,倾向于不提供指导价格,份额较小时,倾向于提供指导价格。且总体看,尽管制造商提供指导价格有利于减少渠道冲突、扩大产品销量,但因多数情况下会损坏零售商利益,应通过协调契约在确保制造商和零售商网络渠道同价的前提下实现双赢。
[Abstract]:In reality, many commodities are being sold through multiple channels, but multi-channel sales, although they can improve the flexibility of the supply chain, can also lead to channel conflicts. Price is an important factor leading to channel conflict. For a supply chain system composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer that has a network channel, the level of retail sales promotion efforts and the free-rider behavior of consumers are considered. Under the Stackelberg game which is dominated by the manufacturer, according to whether the manufacturer provides the retailer network channel to guide the price, the research each channel pricing strategy can find, The optimal profit of manufacturer is positively correlated with the level of promotion effort and the proportion of hitchhiker; the retailer has the best level of promotion effort, and its optimal profit is negatively correlated with the proportion of hitchhiker; when the wholesale price is low, the optimal profit is negatively correlated with the proportion of hitchhiker. The retailer can accept the manufacturer to offer the instruction price; when the manufacturer network channel basic market share is bigger, tends not to provide the instruction price, the share is small, inclines to offer the instruction price. Although the manufacturer provides the instruction price to help reduce the channel conflict, expands the product volume, but because in most cases will damage the retailer benefit, should realize the win-win through the coordination contract under the premise which ensures the manufacturer and the retailer network channel the same price.
【作者单位】: 大连海事大学交通运输管理学院;
【基金】:国家社会科学基金项目“大数据背景下网购消费者行为模式与网购评语引导机理研究”(15CGL031) 大连市科技计划项目“基于超网络的城市交通出行行为动态模型与算法研究”(2015A11GX016)
【分类号】:F274


本文编号:1599025

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