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双渠道制造商应对新制造商进入时的定价策略

发布时间:2018-03-14 20:29

  本文选题:双渠道供应链 切入点:利润最大化 出处:《山东大学》2017年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:随着网络经济的不断发展,我国网购用户数量不断增长,网络市场交易规模不断扩大。网购规模的快速增长吸引着越来越多的制造商在传统零售渠道的基础上开辟网上销售渠道。网上销售渠道和传统零售渠道相比,具有十分明显的优势:网上销售对初始投资的要求较低,销售不受时间和空间的限制,有助于企业减少库存和积压,从而使企业降低成本,增加盈利。因此,先进入市场的制造商纷纷在传统零售渠道的基础上开辟网上销售渠道,发展成为双渠道制造商,制造商、零售商和消费者之间形成了完整的双渠道供应链,而后进入市场的制造商在资金和管理能力有限的情况下,更倾向于通过网上销售渠道进入市场销售产品。国内外文献中不乏有关双渠道冲突与协调的论述,双渠道供应链主要有分散决策和集中决策两种决策方式,分散决策是指制造商和零售商分别出于最大化自身利润的目的进行定价决策,集中决策是指制造商和零售商出于最大化共同利润的目的进行定价决策。然而不论采用何种决策方式,新制造商的进入必然对先进入市场的双渠道制造商形成冲击,因此,双渠道制造商为了保证实现自身利润的最大化,必然会重新调整定价策略。本文探讨的就是双渠道制造商在应对新制造商进入后的定价策略问题。通过区分集中决策和分散决策两种决策方式,以及新制造商进入前后两个阶段,分别构建模型和进行数值算例模拟,分析后进入市场的制造商是如何影响双渠道制造商和零售商的定价、需求和利润的,以及各参数变化对双渠道供应链和新制造商的定价、需求和利润会产生什么影响。通过本文的研究发现:在新制造商进入市场之前,和集中决策相比,分散决策对双渠道制造商和零售商更有利。不论分散决策还是集中决策,制造商和零售商的市场需求、定价决策以及利润水平都是由市场的潜在需求总量,消费需求对产品价格的敏感程度,需求对渠道价格差异的转移程度以及生产成品等客观条件决定的。新制造商进入市场后,分散决策对新制造商更有利,而集中决策对双渠道制造商和零售商更有利。新制造商进入市场后,双渠道制造商的最优定价策略是小幅提高网上销售渠道的价格和批发价格,这是因为双渠道制造商作为先行者掌握了更多的市场份额,可以通过小幅提高价格的方式来弥补因新制造商进入导致其市场需求下降而造成的利润损失。不论分散决策还是集中决策,对于后进制造商、双渠道制造商和零售商而言,各自的定价策略,需求以及利润除了由新制造商进入前的参数决定之外,还增加了需求对产品2价格的敏感程度,相同渠道下需求对不同产品的价格差异的转移程度,产品和渠道都不相同时价格差异对需求的转移程度以及产品2的生产成本这些参数的影响。
[Abstract]:With the continuous development of the network economy, the number of online shopping users in China is increasing. The rapid growth of online shopping has attracted more and more manufacturers to open up online sales channels based on traditional retail channels. There is a very obvious advantage: online sales of the initial investment requirements are low, sales are not subject to time and space constraints, help enterprises reduce inventory and backlog, thereby enabling enterprises to reduce costs and increase profitability. One after another, manufacturers entering the market have opened up online sales channels on the basis of traditional retail channels, and developed into a complete dual-channel supply chain between manufacturers, manufacturers, retailers and consumers. Then the manufacturers who enter the market are more inclined to enter the market through the online marketing channels under the condition of limited capital and management ability. There is no lack of discussion on the conflict and coordination of the two channels in the literature at home and abroad. The dual channel supply chain has two kinds of decision-making modes: decentralized decision and centralized decision. Decentralized decision means manufacturer and retailer make pricing decision to maximize their own profit respectively. Centralized decision-making means that manufacturers and retailers make pricing decisions for the purpose of maximizing their common profits. However, no matter what kind of decision is taken, the entry of new manufacturers will inevitably impact the manufacturers who enter the market first, so, In order to maximize their profits, the dual-channel manufacturers, It is inevitable to readjust the pricing strategy. This paper discusses the pricing strategy of the dual-channel manufacturer in response to the entry of the new manufacturer. After the new manufacturer enters the two stages, the model is built and the numerical example is simulated, and how the manufacturer entering the market influences the pricing, demand and profit of the manufacturer and retailer, and then analyzes how the new manufacturer enters the market and how to influence the pricing, demand and profit of the manufacturer and retailer. And what effect each parameter change will have on the pricing, demand and profit of the dual-channel supply chain and the new manufacturer. Through the research of this paper, we find that before the new manufacturer enters the market, it is compared with the centralized decision. Decentralized decisions are more beneficial to manufacturers and retailers with dual channels. Whether decentralized or centralized, market demand, pricing decisions and profit levels of manufacturers and retailers are all determined by the total potential demand in the market. The sensitivity of consumer demand to product price, the degree of shift of demand to channel price difference, and the objective conditions of producing finished product, etc. When the new manufacturer enters the market, the decentralized decision is more advantageous to the new manufacturer. When the new manufacturer enters the market, the optimal pricing strategy of the dual-channel manufacturer is to increase the price of the online sales channel and wholesale price slightly. This is because the dual-channel manufacturers have gained more market share as pioneers. You can compensate for the loss of profits caused by the entry of new manufacturers to their market by slightly increasing their prices. For lower-tier manufacturers, dual-channel manufacturers and retailers, whether decentralized or centralized, Their pricing strategies, demand and profits are determined by the parameters of the new manufacturer before entering, and they also increase the sensitivity of demand to the price of product 2, and the degree of transfer of demand to the price difference of different products under the same channel. The influence of price difference on the degree of demand transfer and the production cost of product 2 when the product and channel are different.
【学位授予单位】:山东大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F274

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