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基于计算实验的供应链网络企业竞合关系研究

发布时间:2018-03-22 06:04

  本文选题:供应链网络 切入点:计算实验方法 出处:《宁波大学》2014年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:随着市场经济一体化进程的不断加快,企业与企业之间的竞争已经转变为供应链与供应链之间的竞争,环境的复杂性以及竞争方式的转变改变了供应链管理的运作模式,同时更加为供应链管理带来了挑战。 本文基于计算实验的方法,从企业间既竞争又合作的特殊关系出发,在对影响供应链网络企业间竞合关系的重要因素的基础上,对供应链网络企业间竞合关系进行研究。本文的主要内容如下所述: 1、在构建制造商和销售商博弈模型的基础上,将计算实验方法引入到供应链系统的研究中去,通过自下而上的研究方法,利用多主体建模技术来建立供应链模型,设计了关于供应链网络企业竞合关系的计算实验,以实验的方法尝试进行供应链网络企业间竞合关系的研究。并且实验发现的规律与演化博弈方法所得出的结论基本一致,,证明了实验的可行性。通过实验我们发现,企业合作的支付矩阵以及初始合作比例对供应链网络企业间的竞合关系有着重要的影响; 2、针对监督机制和信誉机制分别设计了实验,并对实验中发现的规律性现象进行总结,通过实验我们发现: (1)监督机制对供应链网络企业间的竞合关系具有一定的保障作用,但是由于监督机制的局限性(不是所有的背叛行为都会被发现),只要存在监督不严的情况,背叛行为就会一直存在于系统中,部分行为主体采取背叛行为后取得高于常规的收益,这种行为就会被系统中的其他行为主体学习,进而导致了背叛行为的泛滥。但是高监督水平可以使系统的合作率维持在比较高的水平上;低监督水平下,系统中的背叛行为最终会在系统中泛滥。 (2)在信誉机制下,良好的信誉环境是企业采取合作策略的前提条件,在较差的信誉环境中,企业因为对于合作的收益预期不乐观,害怕遭遇背叛而宁愿采取背叛策略获得较少的收益;同时,在企业采取合作策略时,对企业采取一定的信誉激励也是十分必要的,通过实验发现,对于企业信誉采取惩罚措施反而加速了企业采取背叛策略。 3、结合上文的结论对联想供应链控制采购成本失败的原因进行了研究并提出了相应的建议。
[Abstract]:With the acceleration of the process of market economy integration, the competition between enterprises has been transformed into the competition between supply chain and supply chain. The complexity of environment and the change of competition mode have changed the operation mode of supply chain management. At the same time, it brings challenges to supply chain management. Based on the method of computational experiment, this paper starts from the special relationship of competition and cooperation among enterprises, and on the basis of the important factors that affect the relationship between enterprises in the supply chain network. The main contents of this paper are as follows:. 1. On the basis of constructing the game model of manufacturer and seller, the computational experiment method is introduced into the research of supply chain system. Through the bottom-up research method, the multi-agent modeling technology is used to establish the supply chain model. This paper designs a computational experiment on the competitive relationship between enterprises in the supply chain network, tries to study the relationship between the enterprises in the supply chain network by the experimental method, and the rule found by the experiment is basically consistent with the conclusion of the evolutionary game method. The feasibility of the experiment is proved. Through the experiment, we find that the payment matrix and the initial cooperation ratio of the enterprise cooperation have an important influence on the competition and cooperation relationship between the enterprises in the supply chain network. 2. According to the supervision mechanism and reputation mechanism, the experiment is designed, and the regular phenomena found in the experiment are summarized. Through the experiment, we find that:. (1) the supervision mechanism can guarantee the competition and cooperation relationship among the enterprises in the supply chain network, but because of the limitation of the supervision mechanism (not all betrayal will be found, as long as there is a situation of lax supervision, Betrayal will always exist in the system, some of the behavior subjects take betrayal behavior to obtain higher than the conventional benefits, and this behavior will be learned by other actors in the system. But the high level of supervision can keep the cooperation rate of the system at a relatively high level; under the low level of supervision, the betrayal behavior in the system will eventually spread in the system. 2) under the reputation mechanism, a good reputation environment is a prerequisite for enterprises to adopt cooperative strategies. In a poor reputation environment, enterprises are not optimistic about the benefits of cooperation. At the same time, it is necessary to take a certain credit incentive when enterprises adopt cooperative strategy. On the other hand, punitive measures for corporate reputation accelerate the adoption of betrayal strategy. 3. Based on the above conclusions, the causes of the failure of Lenovo supply chain to control purchasing cost are studied and the corresponding suggestions are put forward.
【学位授予单位】:宁波大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F273.7

【参考文献】

相关期刊论文 前1条

1 张庆一;李贵春;踪程;;供应链企业竞争与合作的博弈分析[J];统计与决策;2010年09期



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