碳交易机制下存在冲突行为的供应链协调研究

发布时间：2018-03-24 05:08

本文选题：碳减排　切入点：冲突行为　出处：《铁道科学与工程学报》2016年05期

【摘要】：研究当上游制造商面临碳交易机制而采取碳减排行动使得下游制造商的生产成本上升的冲突型两级低碳供应链的协调问题。假设上游制造商和下游制造商之间为Stackelberg博弈,其中上游制造商为主导者,下游制造商为跟随者。考虑分散决策、集中决策、生产成本共担和减排收益共享契约下的分散决策4种情形并利用逆向归纳法求解。研究结果表明:冲突行为越激烈,减排效率越低且商品零售价格越高;引入契约后分散供应链的最优投资没有变化,仍然无法达到集中供应链的最优投资;单一的生产成本共担契约或者减排收益共享契约无法实现供应链参与约束更无法达到激励相容约束,根本原因是共担的成本或者共享的减排收益会通过批发价机制进行转移,故而该供应链难以实现协调。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the coordination problem of a conflict two-level low-carbon supply chain in which upstream manufacturers face a carbon trading mechanism and take carbon abatement actions to increase the production cost of downstream manufacturers. Suppose that upstream manufacturers and downstream manufacturers are Stackelberg games. The upstream manufacturer is the leader, the downstream manufacturer is the follower. Four cases of decentralized decision under production cost sharing and emission reduction profit-sharing contract are solved by reverse induction. The results show that the more intense the conflict behavior, the lower the emission reduction efficiency and the higher the retail price. After the introduction of contract, the optimal investment of decentralized supply chain is not changed, and the optimal investment of centralized supply chain can not be reached. A single production cost sharing contract or emission reduction revenue sharing contract can not achieve supply chain participation constraints and can not achieve incentive compatibility constraints, the fundamental reason is that shared costs or shared emission reduction benefits will be transferred through wholesale price mechanism. Therefore, the supply chain is difficult to achieve coordination.
【作者单位】：中南大学商学院;
【基金】：教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关资助项目(10JZD0020) 国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71431006) 中国博士后基金资助项目(2014M562145)
【分类号】：F274

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