部分延期支付下损失厌恶型供应链的决策与协调
本文选题:损失厌恶 切入点:部分延期支付 出处:《东华大学》2017年硕士论文
【摘要】:随着社会经济的发展和科学技术的进步,消费者需求的差异化越来越大,推动产品更新换代加速,使得很多产品具备了季节性产品的特征:市场需求不稳定、销售期比生产提前期短、没有售完产品的残值较低。行业环境的变化、市场需求不确定和价格波动等不确定性因素会导致决策者面临着很大风险,风险增加意味着损失的可能性会增加。一旦面临高风险的市场时,决策者的行为往往变得谨慎,表现出损失厌恶的特质。季节性产品市场中直接面临这种风险的零售商,其损失厌恶的特性表现得更为明显,也更需要受到供应链核心企业的关注。目前,在企业实际管理和学术研究领域越来越重视损失厌恶对供应链及各成员决策和收益的影响作用。延期支付作为一种激励和协调手段,是指供应链上游成员允许其下游成员在销售期结束后再归还货款的一种商业信用,也是直接分担风险的一种有效方式。本文在分析S玩具公司的实际运营问题的基础上,重点研究延期支付对损失厌恶供应链的决策和协调的影响,其中供应商为了控制自身风险,要求损失厌恶型零售商在订货时立即支付部分货款作为预付款。本文的具体内容如下:首先基于S玩具公司的实际运营情况,分析了其时尚玩具的终端零售商的损失厌恶特性,以及这种损失厌恶对供应链利益的影响。然后基于S公司存在的问题,建立了一个由单损失中性供应商和多损失厌恶零售商构成的供应链模型,讨论了零售商的损失厌恶特性和个数对供应链利益、决策和协调的影响。其次,引入部分延期支付契约,对比分析了引入契约前后供应链各方利益的变化,以及部分延期支付对损失中性和损失厌恶供应链协调机制的不同;通过理论和数值分析证明了延期支付比例和批发价格联合协调的可行性。最后,结合S玩具公司的实际情况和问题,提出可供参考的建议。研究发现,在供应链中多个损失厌恶型零售商间存在纳什均衡;分散决策下,存在唯一的最优订货量能够最优化零售商的期望效用,并且最优订货决策是损失厌恶的减函数,是零售商数量的增函数,是延期支付比例的增函数;采用部分延期支付策略能增加系统收益;当批发价格一定时,在零售商损失厌恶或数量满足一定条件下,部分延期支付在一定程度上能够协调损失厌恶型供应链;供应商可以通过设计延期支付比例和批发价格组合合同来实现系统协调,这种协调具有更强的柔性。最后基于这些研究结果,给S公司提出了面临损失厌恶型零售商的参考性建议。
[Abstract]:With the development of society and economy and the progress of science and technology, the difference of consumer demand is more and more big, which accelerates the upgrading of products, and makes many products have the characteristics of seasonal products: market demand is unstable,The sales period is shorter than the production lead time and the residual value of the product is lower than that of the finished product.Due to the change of industry environment, uncertainty of market demand and price fluctuation, the decision makers will face great risks, and the increase of risk means that the possibility of loss will increase.When faced with high-risk markets, policymakers tend to behave cautiously and show a loss aversion.In the seasonal product market, the loss aversion of the retailers who directly face this kind of risk is more obvious, and it needs more attention of the core enterprises in the supply chain.At present, more and more attention has been paid to the influence of loss aversion on the decision and income of the supply chain and its members in the field of practical management and academic research.As a means of incentive and coordination, deferred payment is a commercial credit that the upstream members of the supply chain allow their downstream members to return the payment after the end of the sales period. It is also an effective way to share the risks directly.Based on the analysis of the actual operation of S Toy Company, this paper focuses on the impact of deferred payment on the decision and coordination of loss averse supply chain.A loss-averse retailer is required to pay part of the purchase price as an advance payment immediately upon ordering.The specific contents of this paper are as follows: firstly, based on the actual operation of S Toy Company, this paper analyzes the loss aversion characteristics of the end retailer of its fashion toys, and the influence of this loss aversion on the benefit of supply chain.Then a supply chain model consisting of single loss neutral supplier and multiple loss averse retailer is established based on the existing problems of S Company. The effects of retailers' loss aversion characteristics and number on the benefit, decision making and coordination of supply chain are discussed.Secondly, the partial deferred payment contract is introduced, and the change of the interests of all parties in the supply chain before and after the introduction of the contract is compared, and the difference of the coordination mechanism between the loss neutral and loss averse supply chain of partial deferred payment is analyzed.The feasibility of joint coordination of deferred payment ratio and wholesale price is proved by theoretical and numerical analysis.Finally, combined with the actual situation and problems of S toy company, some suggestions for reference are put forward.It is found that there is Nash equilibrium among multiple loss-averse retailers in the supply chain, and under decentralized decision, there is a unique optimal order quantity that can optimize the expected utility of the retailer, and the optimal ordering decision is a reduction function of loss aversion.It is the increment function of the number of retailers and the increment function of the proportion of deferred payment; the partial deferred payment strategy can increase the system income; when the wholesale price is fixed, the retailer will suffer loss aversion or the quantity can satisfy certain conditions.Partial deferred payment can coordinate loss aversion supply chain to a certain extent and suppliers can achieve system coordination by designing deferred payment ratio and wholesale price combination contract which is more flexible.Finally, based on the results of these studies, the paper gives S Company a reference recommendation for loss aversion retailers.
【学位授予单位】:东华大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F274;F721.7
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