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基于演化博弈的供应链企业间合作广告研究

发布时间:2018-04-06 20:32

  本文选题:两级供应链 切入点:合作广告 出处:《天津大学》2014年硕士论文


【摘要】:随着市场竞争的加剧以及人们对管理认识的深化,供应链管理逐渐成为理论与应用热点,良好的供应链合作伙伴关系是供应链有效运转的前提。供应链合作广告作为一种重要的合作伙伴协调机制,正被越来越多的企业所采用。 现有供应链合作广告的研究往往注重分析制造商与零售商在合作中的最优策略选择以及各种因素的影响作用,对于合作广告本身能否成功则缺乏相关的研究。基于此,本文从企业有限理性出发,首先运用演化博弈方法,建立了由制造商群体与零售商群体组成的两级供应链中企业合作广告的博弈模型,,研究了合作广告成败机制并对其中的主要影响因素进行了深入的分析;然后构建了包含监督惩罚机制的合作广告扩展模型,并探讨了此时合作广告演化的过程及变化。最后通过两个算例对本文模型进行了验证。 通过研究发现,在没有监督惩罚机制时,如果零售商能够成功的进行单方广告,则只要制造商与零售商合作时的收益大于不合作时的收益,双方就会进行合作广告;当零售商进行单方广告失败时,如果双方合作时的收益大于不合作时的收益,则合作广告会出现两种演化稳定状态,此时,各个参数会影响合作广告的演化路径,具体来说,制造商与零售商的边际产品收益越大,合作与非合作时的广告投入费用越少,制造商的广告分担率越小,则双方合作的可能性就越大。当引入监督惩罚机制后,零售商的违约行为受到抑制,合作广告更有可能取得成功。另外还发现制造商群体与零售商群体的初始策略状态也会影响合作广告的成败。 本文的相关研究不仅完善了供应链合作广告理论,而且能够对现实中的企业实践提供一定的指导帮助。
[Abstract]:With the intensification of market competition and the deepening of people's understanding of management, supply chain management has gradually become a hot topic in theory and application. A good supply chain partnership is the premise of effective operation of supply chain.As an important coordination mechanism of partners, cooperative advertising in supply chain is being adopted by more and more enterprises.The existing research on cooperative advertising in supply chain often focuses on the analysis of the optimal strategy choice of manufacturers and retailers in cooperation and the influence of various factors. However, there is a lack of relevant research on the success of cooperative advertising itself.Based on this, based on the limited rationality of enterprises, this paper first establishes a game model of cooperative advertising in a two-level supply chain, which is composed of manufacturer group and retailer group, by using evolutionary game method.This paper studies the success or failure mechanism of cooperative advertising and analyzes the main influencing factors. Then it constructs an extended model of cooperative advertising including supervision and punishment mechanism and probes into the evolution process and changes of cooperative advertising.Finally, the model is verified by two examples.Through the research, it is found that if the retailer can successfully carry out unilateral advertising, if the retailer can successfully carry out unilateral advertising, then if the profit of the manufacturer and the retailer is greater than that of the non-cooperation, the two sides will carry out cooperative advertising.When the retailer fails in unilateral advertising, if the profit of cooperation is greater than that of non-cooperation, there will be two evolutionary stable states in cooperative advertising. In this case, each parameter will affect the evolutionary path of cooperative advertising.The greater the marginal product income of the manufacturer and the retailer, the less the cost of advertising investment in cooperation and non-cooperation, and the smaller the share of advertising between manufacturer and retailer, the greater the possibility of cooperation.When the mechanism of supervision and punishment is introduced, the retailer's default behavior is restrained, and cooperative advertising is more likely to succeed.It is also found that the initial strategic status of manufacturers and retailers also affects the success or failure of cooperative advertising.The research in this paper not only improves the theory of cooperative advertising in supply chain, but also provides some guidance and help for the practice of enterprises in reality.
【学位授予单位】:天津大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F274;F713.8;F224.32

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