资金约束供应链中贸易信用合同的决策与价值

发布时间：2018-04-06 21:13

本文选题：贸易信用　切入点：资金约束　出处：《管理科学学报》2013年12期

【摘要】：论文考虑了一个简单二层供应链,其中零售商向供应商采购单一品种的产品,随后在产品市场上以一定价格进行销售.供应商愿意为资金不足的零售商提供延迟支付的贸易信用合同.研究表明,当零售商存在破产风险且承担有限责任时,贸易信用能有效激励零售商增加采购量,且零售商初始资金越少,其采购量越大;另外,贸易信用合同可解决供应链中零售商的资金约束问题,部分协调供应链,为资金约束供应链创造新价值.
[Abstract]:A simple two-tier supply chain is considered in which retailers purchase a single product from the supplier and then sell it at a certain price in the product market.Suppliers are willing to offer delayed payment of trade credit contracts to underfunded retailers.The research shows that when retailers have bankruptcy risk and take limited liability, trade credit can effectively stimulate retailers to increase the amount of procurement, and the less the retailer initial funds, the larger the amount of procurement; in addition,The trade credit contract can solve the problem of retailer's capital constraint in the supply chain, partly coordinate the supply chain, and create new value for the capital constrained supply chain.
【作者单位】：复旦大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972046;71172039) 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-10-0340)
【分类号】：F740;F224

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