返利模式下的供应链决策与协调优化研究

发布时间：2018-04-13 21:19

本文选题：现时偏向型偏好理论 + 随机需求　；参考：《华中科技大学》2016年博士论文

【摘要】：随着产品更新速度的加快及电子商务的迅速发展,营销已经成为企业生存、赢得竞争的致胜法宝。在现代企业的市场营销策略中,返利是一种广泛采用且影响深远的促销手段之一。与直接打折促销不同的是,返利促销需要消费者先全价付款,然后按照一定的规则在规定的期限内进行兑现。本论文在企业调研、总结与评述相关研究文献的基础上,深入探讨和分析了返利模式下的供应链决策与协调优化问题。首先,基于消费者现时偏向型偏好理论研究了制造商与零售商的最优返利与定价策略；其次,探讨了随机需求下供应链成员的联合返利决策；然后,考虑了带有风险偏好的供应链返利契约如何协调供应链的问题。最后,针对电子商务背景下日益兴起的第三方返利模式进行了研究。论文主要完成的创新性工作总结如下：针对返利促销特有的对消费者的影响机制(先购买再兑现),运用现时偏向型偏好理论,从消费者行为角度刻画了返利促销对消费者购买决策及兑现行为的影响,将市场中的消费者区分为天真型与经验型两类消费者群体,并对不同类型消费者的购买决策与兑现行为进行建模,以此为基础研究了供应链中最常见的制造商对消费者返利模式,基于Stackelberg博弈理论框架下分析了制造商的最优返利策略与零售商的最优定价策略。研究了随机需求下的供应链联合返利决策,具体返利模式包括制造商与零售商同时向消费者提供返利、仅制造商向消费者提供返利及仅零售商对消费者提供返利。在联合返利模式下,基于两种常见的乘法需求函数(非线性乘法需求与线性乘法需求),探讨和分析了制造商的最优返利策略及零售商的最优返利与订货策略,并在博弈理论框架下证明了纳什均衡的存在性和唯一性。进一步地,通过对不同供应链返利模式的对比,研究了不同返利模式对供应链成员利润的影响。考虑了带有风险偏好的供应链返利契约。制造商经常采用渠道返利来激励零售商提高订货量,因此与返利相关的契约可以用来协调供应链。当制造商面对具有风险偏好的零售商时,以条件风险价值CVaR为风险度量准则,研究了制造商该如何设计有效的供应链返利契约来协调供应链的问题。通过分析两种不同类型的供应链返利与惩罚契约(以订货量为基准的ORP契约和以销售额为基准的SRP契约),给出了实现供应链协调的契约参数条件,并与风险中性时的情形进行了对比分析。结合电子商务迅速发展的时代背景,提出和研究了一种新的返利模式—第三方返利。在第三方返利平台的参与下,消费者除网络直销模式购买产品外,还可以通过返利模式购买产品。以消费者效用理论为基础,深入研究了网络零售商的定价决策、佣金决策及第三方返利平台的返利决策问题。针对两种销售模式的冲突问题,设计了一种改进的收益共享契约来协调整个系统,实现了网络零售商与第三方返利平台的合作共赢。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development to accelerate the speed of product updates and e-commerce, marketing has become the enterprise survival, the key to success. To win the competition in the market marketing strategy of modern enterprise, the rebate is a widely used and the influence of profound promotions. With direct discounts is different, rebate promotion requires consumers to pay full price then, cash within the prescribed time limit according to certain rules. In this paper, corporate research, and summarizes the literature review of related research, in-depth discussion and analysis of the rebate under the mode of supply chain decision and coordination optimization problems. Firstly, the current consumer biased preference theory of manufacturer and retailer's optimal rebate and based on the pricing strategy; secondly, discusses the stochastic demand and supply chain members with rebate decision; then, considering the risk preference of the supply chain with the rebate How to coordinate the supply chain contract. Finally, according to the background of e-commerce the rise of the third party rebate mode were studied. The innovative work of the thesis is as follows: according to the characteristic of consumer rebate promotion mechanism (buy cash again), the use of the present biased preference theory, from the Perspective of consumer behavior describe the rebate promotion on consumer purchase decision and influence cash behavior, will be in the market for consumers to distinguish between innocent and experience of two types of consumer groups, and for different types of consumer purchase decision-making and cash behavior modeling, based on the supply chain in the most common manufacturer to consumer rebate model, theoretical framework Stackelberg Game Analysis of the optimal pricing strategy and optimal rebate of retailers and manufacturers. Based on stochastic demand is studied for Chain joint rebate rebate mode including specific decisions, manufacturers and retailers also offer rebates to consumers, manufacturers only to provide consumers with the rebate and the only retailer offers rebates to consumers. In rebate mode, two kinds of multiplication based on demand function (non linear multiplication demand and linear multiplication demand), discussion and analysis of the optimal rebate and the optimal ordering strategy of manufacturer rebate and retailers, and prove the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in game theory framework. Furthermore, through the comparison of different supply chain rebate mode, the effects of different rebate mode on the profits of supply chain members. Considering the contract of supply chain with risk preference rebate the manufacturer. Often used channel rebates to encourage the retailer to increase order quantity, so the relevant contract and rebate can be used to coordinate the supply chain when. Manufacturers face the retailer with risk preferences, taking the conditional value at risk CVaR risk measurement criteria, study how to design a supply chain contract manufacturer rebate effectively to coordinate the supply chain problems. Through the analysis of two different types of supply chain, rebate and penalty contract (to order quantity as the benchmark ORP and a sales contract the benchmark SRP contract), contract implementation conditions of supply chain coordination is given, and the risk neutral situation were analyzed. With the rapid development of electronic commerce research background, a new third party rebate mode and put forward in the third party. The rebate rebate platform under the participation of consumers network marketing model to buy products, you can also buy products through the rebate mode. The consumer utility theory, in-depth study of the online retailer's pricing decision, the Commission Decision The rebate decision problem of the three party rebate platform is designed. Aiming at the conflict of two sales modes, an improved revenue sharing contract is designed to coordinate the whole system, which realizes the win-win cooperation between the online retailer and the third party rebate platform.

【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F274

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