基于低碳设计的创新产品研发契约激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-04-21 18:37

本文选题：低碳设计 + 激励机制　；参考：《工业技术经济》2017年05期

【摘要】：在创新产品市场中低碳环保的产品设计受到消费者的极大关注,本文通过构建生产者和研发方之间的研发合作契约机制,激励研发方在设计中提高零部件的绿色度,从而为企业供应链获得更多的市场利润。在研发方绿色研发成本信息为公共信息和私有信息的不同情景下,生产者作为Stackelberg博弈的领导者设计了包含版权支付和版权收益分成两个契约条款的激励机制。研究比较发现,当研发方的绿色研发能力为低水平的概率超过一定比值时,采用不对称信息下的版权甄别契约组合比对称信息下的单一契约更有效,这时生产商和供应链整体能获得更多利润;反之,采用单一契约效果更好。同时,契约激励机制使低碳研发能力水平高的研发方在甄别契约中获得更多利润,而低水平研发方只获得保留利润。
[Abstract]:In the market of innovative products, low carbon and environmental protection product design has attracted great attention from consumers. In this paper, through the construction of R & D cooperation contract mechanism between producers and R & D parties, the R & D party is encouraged to improve the green degree of components in the design. Thus for the enterprise supply chain to obtain more market profits. Under different situations where the R & D cost information is public information and private information producer as the leader of Stackelberg game designs an incentive mechanism which includes two contract clauses: copyright payment and copyright revenue division. It is found that when the probability of green R & D ability of R & D is lower than a certain ratio, the combination of copyright discrimination contracts under asymmetric information is more effective than a single contract under symmetric information. Producers and the supply chain as a whole can make more profit; conversely, a single contract is better. At the same time, the incentive mechanism of the contract enables the R & D parties with the high level of low carbon R & D ability to obtain more profits in the screening contracts, while the low level R & D parties only get the retained profits.
【作者单位】：鲁东大学;南京理工大学;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(No.71472089)
【分类号】：F273.1

【相似文献】