碳信息不对称情形下的低碳供应链运作与优化

发布时间：2018-05-04 05:01

本文选题：低碳供应链 + 低碳政策　；参考：《华南理工大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来,各国纷纷推出碳交易、碳税等低碳政策,对企业的二氧化碳排放进行限制,在此背景下,企业的运营与管理面临重大的变革。在低碳政策下,碳排放量、碳配额与碳价格等因素将如何影响企业运作,不同的政策是否会带来截然不同的决策结果,这些问题均成为利益相关方的焦点。目前,低碳政策的推行还存在企业参与度低、碳信息不透明等难题,可能导致企业间的谎报行为,并制约供应链整体效率。因此,各低碳政策下的企业谎报决策及其规避机制也是供应链管理的重要问题。本文构建以制造商为主导的二级供应链,结合碳交易政策、碳税政策,并引入免费配额的碳税政策,率先基于“基准法”配额分配方式,将企业区分为低碳排放企业与高碳排放企业;并分别在对称与非对称碳信息下,研究低碳政策对不同类型企业的运作决策的影响及其协调机制,为企业的运作决策与政府的低碳政策决策提供理论依据。首先,在对称碳信息下,分别基于分权式与集权式供应链,探讨在无减排政策、碳交易政策、固定税率的碳税政策与免费配额的碳税政策下的供应链最优决策;分析各政策下的碳价格、碳排放量及碳配额系数对供应链总利润、利润分配、供应链模式的影响;并从多角度对各低碳政策进行比较,说明在不同情形下各低碳政策的优劣情况不同,且在低碳政策下低碳排放企业更容易通过改变合作方式提高自身利润。其次,在不对称碳信息下,分析不同类型的制造商与零售商在不同低碳政策下的谎报决策、影响因素及其供应链影响;说明在不同的低碳政策下供应链成员具有不同的谎报策略;且碳信息不对称下的谎报行为使得部分高碳排放零售商即使不采用减排投资也可获得与无减排政策下相同的利润,降低了低碳政策的减排刺激;且在各低碳政策下较高的价格敏感系数对低碳排放供应链更有利。最后,在不同的低碳政策下,采用收益共享契约协调对称及不对称碳信息下的分权式供应链,分别给出使得对称信息下的分权式供应链利润最大化的收益共享系数的取值区间以及促使不对称碳信息下的供应链中的零售商真实反馈碳信息的契约参数,并运用数值分析法对协调结果进行验证。
[Abstract]:In recent years, many countries have introduced low-carbon policies, such as carbon trading, carbon tax and so on, to limit the carbon dioxide emissions of enterprises. Under this background, the operation and management of enterprises are facing great changes. In low carbon policy, how carbon emissions, carbon quotas and carbon prices will affect the operation of enterprises, and whether different policies will lead to different decisions, these issues have become the focus of stakeholders. At present, the implementation of low carbon policy still has problems such as low participation and opaque carbon information, which may lead to false behavior among enterprises and restrict the efficiency of supply chain as a whole. Therefore, it is also an important issue of supply chain management for enterprises to make false decision making and avoid mechanism under low carbon policy. In this paper, we construct a manufacturer oriented secondary supply chain, combine carbon trading policy, carbon tax policy, and introduce carbon tax policy of free quota, and take the lead based on the quota allocation method of "benchmark method". The enterprises are divided into low carbon emission enterprises and high carbon emitting enterprises, and under the symmetrical and asymmetric carbon information, the effects of low carbon policies on the operation decisions of different types of enterprises and their coordination mechanisms are studied. It provides the theoretical basis for the operation decision of the enterprise and the low carbon policy decision of the government. Firstly, under symmetrical carbon information, based on decentralized and centralized supply chain, this paper discusses the optimal decision of supply chain under no emission reduction policy, carbon trading policy, carbon tax policy with fixed tax rate and carbon tax policy with free quota. Analyze the influence of carbon price, carbon emission and carbon quota coefficient on supply chain total profit, profit distribution, supply chain mode, and compare each low carbon policy from many angles. It shows that the advantages and disadvantages of each low-carbon policy are different in different situations, and it is easier for the low-carbon enterprises to improve their profits by changing the cooperative mode under the low carbon policy. Secondly, under the asymmetric carbon information, we analyze the different types of manufacturers and retailers under different low carbon policy false decision, influencing factors and their supply chain impact; It shows that supply chain members have different false reporting strategies under different low carbon policies, and the false reporting behavior under asymmetric carbon information makes some high-carbon retailers obtain the same profits as those without emission reduction policies even if they do not adopt emission reduction investment. It reduces the incentive to reduce emissions of low-carbon policies, and the higher price sensitivity coefficient is more favorable for low-carbon supply chain under various low-carbon policies. Finally, under different low-carbon policies, a decentralized supply chain with symmetric and asymmetric carbon information is used to coordinate the revenue-sharing contract. The value range of profit sharing coefficient of decentralized supply chain with symmetric information and the contract parameter of retailer's real feedback carbon information under asymmetric carbon information are given, respectively, in which the profit sharing coefficient of decentralized supply chain is maximized under symmetrical information, and the value range of profit sharing coefficient of decentralized supply chain under asymmetric information is given. The coordination results are verified by numerical analysis method.
【学位授予单位】：华南理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F274

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