奖惩机制下制造商竞争的闭环供应链决策模型

发布时间：2018-05-11 04:01

本文选题：制造商竞争 + 闭环供应链　；参考：《中国管理科学》2013年06期

【摘要】：本文分别建立了集中式决策,无奖惩机制的分散式决策以及奖惩机制下考虑制造商竞争的闭环供应链决策模型。通过逆向归纳法对三种情况下决策变量的求解与比较,分别得到了闭环供应链的回购价、批发价、零售价及回收率。研究表明:与无奖惩机制下的分散式决策情形相比,政府奖惩机制能有效引导制造商降低新产品价格、提高回收率、增加闭环供应链各成员企业的利润,同时有利于增加消费者的利益;奖惩机制下主动回收废旧产品的制造商利润增加,不回收的制造商利润降低,有效引导了制造商的回收积极性,同时回收商与零售商利润的增加也提高了她们参与闭环供应链的积极性,进而使得整个闭环供应链的成员企业有效协调。
[Abstract]:In this paper, a centralized decision model, a decentralized decision model without reward and punishment mechanism and a closed-loop supply chain decision model considering manufacturer competition are established respectively. The reverse induction method is used to solve and compare the decision variables in three cases, and the repo price, wholesale price, retail price and recovery rate of the closed-loop supply chain are obtained respectively. The research shows that compared with the decentralized decision-making without reward and punishment mechanism, the government reward and punishment mechanism can effectively guide manufacturers to reduce the price of new products, increase the recovery rate, and increase the profit of the enterprises in the closed-loop supply chain. At the same time, it is beneficial to increase the interests of consumers. Under the mechanism of rewards and punishments, the profit of manufacturers who actively recycle used and used products increases, and the profits of manufacturers who do not recycle are reduced, which effectively leads to the enthusiasm of manufacturers for recycling. At the same time, the increase of the profit of recyclers and retailers also increases their enthusiasm to participate in the closed-loop supply chain, which makes the member enterprises of the whole closed-loop supply chain coordinate effectively.
【作者单位】：中国矿业大学管理学院;东南大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71102164) 教育部人文社会科学研究项目(10YJC630249) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2013W02) 中国博士后基金项目(20110491478) 江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目(2013SJD630123)
【分类号】：F224;F274;F406

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