供应链金融视角下的回购定价研究

发布时间：2018-05-11 09:07

本文选题：供应链金融 + 回购定价　；参考：《企业经济》2015年01期

【摘要】：通过回购契约机制促使零售商和银行开展存货质押融资业务是供应链金融常见的模式之一。传统的Stackelberg主从博弈方法研究表明,银行和零售商的预期收益是关于回购率的增函数,供应商的预期收益是关于回购率的减函数,且参与方的最优回购定价是以银行和零售商占主导地位制定的,这使得位于从属地位和信息末端的供应商必须制定满足银行和零售商的最优定价但不符合参与合作个体理性的原则。因此,应构建Nash协商下的回购契约机制模型。研究表明,该模型下的回购定价,能使供应商遵循激励和理性原则,同时参与者的谈判和议价能力能达到协商均衡。
[Abstract]:It is one of the common modes of supply chain finance to urge retailers and banks to carry out inventory pledge financing through repurchase contract mechanism. The traditional Stackelberg master-slave game method shows that the expected income of banks and retailers is an increasing function of repurchase rate, and the expected income of suppliers is a minus function of repurchase rate. And the optimal repo pricing of the participants is based on the dominance of banks and retailers. This makes it necessary for the supplier at the end of the subordinate position and information to make the optimal pricing for the banks and retailers but not the principle of the individual rationality of participating in the cooperation. Therefore, the repurchase contract mechanism model under Nash negotiation should be constructed. The research shows that the repo pricing under this model can make the supplier follow the principle of motivation and rationality, and the negotiation and bargaining ability of the participants can reach the equilibrium of negotiation.
【作者单位】：重庆城市管理职业学院工商管理学院;
【基金】：重庆市教委2013年度应用技术推广项目“三方动产质押监控系统及仓储管理系统”(批准号:201305) 重庆城市管理职业学院校级科研课题“物流金融业务管理信息系统开发研究——以重庆中集物流有限公司为例”(批准号2013kykt001)
【分类号】：F274;F832.4;F224

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