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带有资金约束的风险厌恶零售商的双渠道供应链运作策略

发布时间:2018-05-13 11:35

  本文选题:双渠道 + 资金约束 ; 参考:《运筹与管理》2017年04期


【摘要】:在对称信息框架下,针对一个风险中性的双渠道制造商和一个存在资金约束的风险厌恶零售商组成的供应链系统,基于Stackelberg博弈理论构建了两种不同的融资模式下(延期支付模式与金融机构借贷模式)双渠道供应链的最优运作决策模型。通过模型分析,分别给出了两种不同融资模式下零售商和制造商的最优运作策略。研究发现,当零售商资金充足或存在资金约束但通过两种不同融资模式融资时,风险中性的双渠道制造商都更愿意和具有风险厌恶特性的零售商合作。当零售商资金不足时,制造商延期支付合同的设计可以有效解决零售商资金不足问题,实现供应链无资金约束时的收益。进一步研究指出,尽管金融机构提供借贷,但在一定条件下,零售商始终不会选择金融机构借贷模式。数值例子发现当制造商对延期支付时间长度敏感性很低时,零售商会偏爱金融机构借贷融资模式。否则,零售商始终偏爱延期支付模式。
[Abstract]:Under the framework of symmetric information, the supply chain system is composed of a risk-neutral dual-channel manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer with financial constraints. Based on Stackelberg game theory, the optimal operation decision model of two-channel supply chain under two different financing modes (deferred payment model and financial institution lending model) is constructed. Through model analysis, the optimal operation strategies of retailers and manufacturers under two different financing modes are given respectively. It is found that when retailers have sufficient funds or have financial constraints but raise funds through two different financing modes, risk-neutral dual-channel manufacturers are more willing to cooperate with retailers with risk-averse characteristics. When the retailer is short of funds, the design of the manufacturer's deferred payment contract can effectively solve the problem of the retailer's lack of funds and realize the profit when the supply chain has no financial constraints. Further research shows that, although financial institutions provide loans, under certain conditions, retailers will never choose the lending mode of financial institutions. Numerical examples show that when manufacturers are less sensitive to the length of deferred payments, retailers prefer financial institutions to borrow and finance. Otherwise, retailers have always preferred deferred payment.
【作者单位】: 河南师范大学商学院;华南理工大学工商管理学院;
【基金】:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71131003,71402171) 浙江省自然科学基金项目(LY14G020004) 河南省高等学校哲学社会科学应用研究重大项目(2017-YYZD-10) 河南省教育厅人文社会科学项目(2017-ZZJH-262) 广州市科技计划项目(201510010149) 博士科研启动课题项目(5101089171136)
【分类号】:F274;F713.32;F715.5

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