非对称信息下考虑企业社会责任的供应链决策

发布时间：2018-05-13 12:31

本文选题：非对称信息 + CSR供应链　；参考：《合肥工业大学学报(自然科学版)》2016年06期

【摘要】：针对由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的两级Stackelberg博弈供应链,文章通过消费者剩余作为其参与企业社会责任(corporate social responsibility,CSR)活动的利润函数,研究了非对称信息下零售商参与CSR和制造商参与CSR活动供应链最优决策。首先,在零售商参与CSR活动下,讨论了市场潜力均值ea和参与CSR活动投入系数对αr零售价、批发价、市场需求量、零售商利润、制造商利润和系统总利润的影响,且分析了在不同的取值范围的市场潜力均值ea下,系统总利润达到最大时活动投入系数α*r最优值。其次,在制造商参与CSR活动下,讨论了市场潜力均值ea和参与CSR活动投入系数αm对以上决策变量的影响,同样考察了在不同的取值范围下的市场潜力均值ea下,系统总利润达到最大时活动投入系数α*m最优值。最后,通过数值仿真验证了以上结论。
[Abstract]:For a two-level Stackelberg game supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, this paper uses the consumer surplus as a profit function for its participation in corporate social responsiveness (CSR) activities. The optimal decision of retailer participating in CSR and manufacturer participating in CSR active supply chain under asymmetric information is studied. Firstly, under the participation of retailers in CSR activities, the effects of the mean value of market potential EA and the input coefficient of participating in CSR activities on 伪 r retail price, wholesale price, market demand, retailer profit, manufacturer profit and total system profit are discussed. At the same time, under the market potential mean EA of different value range, when the total profit of the system reaches the maximum, the best value of the activity input coefficient 伪 r is analyzed. Secondly, under the participation of manufacturers in CSR activities, the effects of the market potential mean EA and the input coefficient 伪 m on the above decision variables are discussed. At the same time, the market potential mean EA under different values is also investigated. When the total profit of the system reaches the maximum, the activity input coefficient 伪 m is optimal. Finally, the above conclusions are verified by numerical simulation.
【作者单位】：合肥工业大学数学学院;
【基金】：高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20120111120013)
【分类号】：F224.9;F270;F274

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