项目联合体总承包模式的收益分配理论及其应用研究
发布时间:2018-05-31 08:12
本文选题:联合体 + 总承包 ; 参考:《湖南大学》2014年硕士论文
【摘要】:目前,,国内工程企业大多只具备设计、施工、采购单一能力,因此通过组建联合体实施项目总承包在大中型项目中得以广泛运用。但是联合体各方在收益分配上难以达成一致,收益分配不当就会损害参与企业的积极性,难以发挥总承包降低建设成本、缩短建设周期的优势,甚至导致合作失败。论文借鉴联盟领域、供应链领域收益分配的研究思路,利用博弈理论对项目联合体总承包模式的收益分配进行了分析和研究。 首先,论文简要分析几种主要总承包模式的特点,重点对总承包联合体的法律特征、组织形式、成员权责、主要模式等进行探讨,并阐述项目联合体总承包模式的优越性及在实践中出现的问题,提出收益分配研究的必要性。 其次,对联合体总承包收益分配理论、原则、影响因素、构成及形式进行研究。分析收益分配的基本原则和主要影响因素,讨论项目总利润的组成及来源,提出行业平均利润加一定比例总承包优化收益的分配形式,从而实现对联合体成员的有效激励。在此基础上,建立基于成员实力、优化贡献能力两种收益分配模型,构建联合体总承包模式收益分配的运作流程。 最后,讨论三种常用项目联合体总承包模式的收益分配问题,建立相应的收益分配模型,确定了联合体各方的利润组成。同时从集体收益最大角度出发,运用博弈理论对总承包优化收益分配进行讨论,得到了项目总承包优化收益在联合体成员间的合理分配比例和付出的最优努力水平,并用算例对结果进行检验。本文还针对项目实施时可能出现的个体理性行为,对个体收益最大、集体收益最大两种优化行动策略博弈下的收益进行对比分析,总结项目总承包优化收益实现的影响因素,并初步分析确保优化目标实现的约束机制。 论文还结合工程实例,对收益分配模型的应用进行说明。在合理的收益分配下,联合体成员企业获得的优化收益较为可观,会积极参与优化设计,总承包优化收益实现度较高,从而为项目联合体总承包的收益分配提供实践指导。
[Abstract]:At present, most of the domestic engineering enterprises only have a single capability of design, construction and procurement, so they can be widely used in large and medium-sized projects by setting up a consortium to carry out the project general contracting. However, it is difficult for all parties in the consortium to reach agreement on the distribution of income, which will damage the enthusiasm of the participating enterprises, reduce the construction cost, shorten the construction cycle and even lead to the failure of cooperation. Based on the research ideas of the alliance and supply chain, this paper analyzes and studies the income distribution of the general contracting mode of the project consortium by using the game theory. First of all, the paper briefly analyzes the characteristics of several major general contracting modes, focusing on the legal characteristics, organizational forms, members' rights and responsibilities, the main modes of the general contracting consortium, etc. The advantages of the general contracting mode of project association and the problems in practice are expounded, and the necessity of research on income distribution is put forward. Secondly, the theory, principle, influencing factors, constitution and form of general contract income distribution are studied. This paper analyzes the basic principles and main influencing factors of income distribution, discusses the composition and source of the total profit of the project, and puts forward the distribution form of the industry average profit plus a certain proportion of the profit optimized by the general contract so as to realize the effective incentive to the members of the association. On this basis, two models of income distribution based on member strength and contribution ability are established, and the operating process of income distribution in general contracting mode is constructed. Finally, this paper discusses the income distribution of three common project consortia, establishes the corresponding profit distribution model, and determines the profit composition of each side of the consortium. At the same time, from the point of view of maximum collective income, the optimal income distribution of general contracting is discussed by using the game theory, and the reasonable distribution ratio and the optimal level of effort among the members of the consortium are obtained. An example is used to test the results. This paper also aims at the individual rational behavior which may appear in the implementation of the project, carries on the comparative analysis to the income under the two kinds of optimization action strategy game of the biggest individual income and the biggest collective benefit, summarizes the influence factor of the project general contract optimization income realization. And the constraint mechanism to ensure the realization of optimization objectives is analyzed preliminarily. The paper also explains the application of income distribution model with engineering examples. Under the reasonable income distribution, the enterprise of the association member obtains the optimization income is quite considerable, will participate in the optimization design actively, the general contract optimization income realization degree is higher, thus provides the practical instruction for the project union general contract income distribution.
【学位授予单位】:湖南大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F426.92
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