考虑风险偏好的果蔬双渠道供应链契约优化研究

发布时间：2018-06-04 06:51

本文选题：双渠道供应链 + 定价决策　；参考：《北京交通大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：果蔬农产品由于富含营养,受到了消费者的日益喜爱,消费量逐年攀升。与此同时,电子商务以及作为果蔬供应商的农业合作社迅猛发展,为了降低成本、扩大市场份额,电子直销渠道受到了果蔬供应商的日益重视。但是电子直销市场的开辟,使得供应商和零售商不仅是传统零售渠道的合作者,更成为了渠道之间的竞争者,使得渠道冲突问题成为了关注的重点;而双渠道供应链的协调直接关系着供应链的成败。此外,由于市场竞争的日益激烈以及果蔬农产品自身的特点,供应链成员在考虑自身利益最大化的同时必须将自身的风险承受能力考虑在内,甚至为了规避风险放弃部分利润,致使双渠道供应链整体利润受到损失。鉴于此,本文以果蔬两级双渠道供应链为研究对象,考虑供应链成员为风险中性者和风险规避者两种情形下,综合运用Stackelberg博弈论和供应链契约等理论和方法,研究了供应链成员的最优定价决策以及如何设计契约以实现双渠道供应链协调优化,并保证渠道成员共赢,从而提升果蔬双渠道供应链的整体竞争实力。首先,考虑当供应链成员为风险中性者时,通过构建垂直一体化决策和分散决策下果蔬双渠道供应链的基本模型,得到供应链决策者的最优定价策略。并对模型进行比较,发现冲突所导致的系统失调,进而加入收益共享契约进行协调优化,并运用数学模型对该契约协调的条件进行论证,证明了存在共赢的情形,即该契约能够实现果蔬双渠道供应链的协调优化。接着假设供应商和零售商均为风险规避者时,运用均值-方差模型和Stackelberg博弈模型研究收益共享契约模型对果蔬双渠道供应链的协调优化,通过模型求解发现能够实现系统利润更优、成员双赢。最后,分别对风险中性和风险规避两种情形进行数值模拟分析。数值分析结果证明了渠道竞争会造成双渠道供应链失调,加入收益共享契约进行优化后发现,无论是在风险中性还是风险规避情形下,当收益共享因子在一定的范围内时,双渠道供应链成员的利润均可以达到帕累托改进,即能够实现双渠道供应链完美共赢协调优化,进一步证明了收益共享契约能够有效协调优化果蔬双渠道供应链。
[Abstract]:Fruit and vegetable agricultural products are more and more popular by consumers because they are rich in nutrition, and the consumption is increasing year by year. At the same time, E-commerce and agricultural cooperatives as suppliers of fruits and vegetables are developing rapidly. In order to reduce the cost and expand the market share, electronic direct selling channels are paid more and more attention by the suppliers of fruits and vegetables. However, with the development of electronic direct marketing market, suppliers and retailers are not only partners in traditional retail channels, but also competitors among channels, which makes channel conflicts become the focus of attention. The coordination of two-channel supply chain is directly related to the success or failure of the supply chain. In addition, due to the increasingly fierce market competition and the characteristics of fruit and vegetable agricultural products, supply chain members must consider their own risk bearing capacity while considering their own interests maximization, and even give up part of the profits in order to avoid risks. As a result, the overall profit of the double channel supply chain is lost. In view of this, this paper takes the two-level two-channel supply chain of fruits and vegetables as the research object, considering that the supply chain members are risk-neutral and risk-averse, and synthetically applies the theory and methods of Stackelberg game theory and supply chain contract. This paper studies the optimal pricing decision of supply chain members and how to design contracts to realize the coordination and optimization of two-channel supply chain and ensure the win-win situation of channel members so as to enhance the overall competitive strength of the two-channel supply chain of fruits and vegetables. Firstly, when the supply chain members are risk-neutral, the optimal pricing strategy of the supply chain decision-maker is obtained by constructing the basic model of the two-channel supply chain under vertical integration decision and decentralized decision. By comparing the model, we find out the system misalignment caused by conflict, and then join the revenue-sharing contract to coordinate and optimize, and use the mathematical model to demonstrate the conditions of coordination of the contract, and prove that there is a win-win situation. That is to say, the contract can realize the coordination optimization of fruit and vegetable double channel supply chain. Then, when suppliers and retailers are both risk-averse, we use mean-variance model and Stackelberg game model to study the coordination optimization of fruit and vegetable dual-channel supply chain by means of revenue-sharing contract model. By solving the model, it is found that the system profit is better and the members win. Finally, the risk-neutral and risk-averse cases are numerically simulated and analyzed. The results of numerical analysis prove that channel competition can lead to the imbalance of the two-channel supply chain. After optimization by joining the revenue-sharing contract, it is found that in the case of risk-neutral or risk-averse, when the revenue-sharing factor is within a certain range, The profit of the members of the double-channel supply chain can reach Pareto improvement, that is, the double-channel supply chain can achieve perfect win-win coordination optimization, which further proves that the revenue-sharing contract can effectively coordinate and optimize the two-channel supply chain of fruits and vegetables.
【学位授予单位】：北京交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274;F323.7

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