供应商侵入问题及双渠道库存管理问题的研究

发布时间：2018-06-06 15:40

本文选题：供应商侵入 + 双渠道　；参考：《清华大学》2014年博士论文

【摘要】：随着电子商务和物流行业的迅速发展，越来越多的供应商或零售商在原有实体店的基础上开设网上直销渠道。本文针对供应商侵入（supplierencroachment）问题和双渠道的库存管理问题进行研究。供应商开设的直销渠道会带来供应商与零售商之间的竞争，这种现象一般被称为供应商“侵入”。本文首先研究了多条竞争供应链环境下的供应商侵入问题。每条供应链由一个供应商和一个零售商组成。主要结果如下：（1）供应商之间可能存在“囚徒困境”现象，，即选择侵入是供应商的占优策略，但供应商侵入后的利润低于侵入前的利润；（2）供应商侵入可能导致供应商和零售商“双输”的局面；（3）随着供应商在直销渠道的营销劣势增大，选择侵入的供应商个数单调递减。其次，本文在由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的两级供应链中将零售商的公平性偏好引入到供应商侵入问题中，研究其对供应商的侵入决策的影响，以及对零售商利润和系统利润的影响。主要结论如下：（1）当零售商具有较强的营销优势和较强的公平性偏好时，供应商侵入会降低供应商的利润；（2）当零售商具有较强的营销优势时，零售商的利润会随着零售商的公平性偏好程度的增强而减少；（3）通过数值实验发现，当零售商具有公平性偏好时，供应商可以选择侵入的参数范围增大；供应商侵入使得零售商获益的参数范围也增大。本文最后考虑了通过双渠道销售的零售商的库存管理问题，其中双渠道的需求均依赖于双渠道的库存水平。我们建立了一个多期的随机动态规划模型并且证明在无限期问题中，在温和的条件下，短视的库存策略是最优的。为了刻画考虑需求对库存水平的依赖性的重要性，本文考虑了一个启发式库存策略（在该策略下，零售商忽略库存水平对需求的影响）并且将最优库存水平与启发式策略下的库存水平进行了比较。数值算例表明两个渠道的最优库存水平可能低于启发式策略下两个渠道的库存水平，并且启发式策略下双渠道的库存水平与最优的库存水平差距之大使得零售商不能忽略库存水平对于需求的影响。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of e-commerce and logistics industry, more and more suppliers or retailers open online direct selling channels on the basis of physical stores. In this paper, the problem of supplier invasion and inventory management is studied. The direct selling channel established by supplier will bring about competition between supplier and retailer, which is generally called "intrusive" by supplier. In this paper, we first study the problem of supplier intrusion in multiple competitive supply chain environments. Each supply chain consists of a supplier and a retailer. The main results are as follows: 1) there may be a "prisoner's dilemma" among suppliers, that is, selective intrusion is the dominant strategy for suppliers. But the profit after the supplier invades is lower than the profit before the invasion.) the supplier invades may lead to the supplier and the retailer "lose" the situation (3) as the supplier in the direct marketing channel marketing disadvantage increases, Secondly, in a two-level supply chain composed of a supplier and a retailer, the retailer's fairness preference is introduced into the supplier intrusion problem. This paper studies its influence on the intrusive decision of suppliers, and on retailer's profit and system profit. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) when retailers have a strong marketing advantage and a strong fairness preference, supplier intrusion will reduce the supplier's profit.) when the retailer has a strong marketing advantage, The profit of the retailer will decrease with the increase of the retailer's fairness preference. Through the numerical experiment, it is found that when the retailer has the fairness preference, the range of parameters that the supplier can choose to intrude increases. Finally, this paper considers the inventory management problem of retailers selling through double channels, in which the demand of both channels depends on the inventory level of both channels. We establish a multi-period stochastic dynamic programming model and prove that the short-sighted inventory strategy is optimal under mild conditions in the indefinite problem. In order to characterize the importance of considering the dependence of demand on inventory levels, this paper considers a heuristic inventory policy, under which, Retailers ignore the impact of inventory level on demand) and compare the optimal inventory level with the inventory level under heuristic strategy. Numerical examples show that the optimal inventory level of the two channels may be lower than that of the two channels under the heuristic strategy. And under the heuristic strategy, the gap between the double channel inventory level and the optimal inventory level is so large that retailers can not ignore the impact of inventory level on demand.
【学位授予单位】：清华大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274;O225

【共引文献】