易逝品供应链的回购契约机制研究

发布时间：2018-06-07 22:04

本文选题：易逝品 + 回购契约　；参考：《兰州交通大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着经济的飞速发展，人们需求的差异化、个性化和不确定性迅速凸显。产品技术不断提高、产品更新速度日益加快、产品的生命周期不断缩短。在这种形势下，易逝品应运而生并得到快速发展。同时，经济一体化和全球化加剧了企业之间的竞争，企业之间的竞争逐步转换为供应链之间的竞争，协调的供应链能够使供应链上各主体达到最佳的收益状态，并增强企业之间的凝聚力，从而达到双赢或多赢。对于易逝品行业而言，由于其产品的特点，供应链管理就显得尤为重要。基于此，，本文对易逝品供应链进行研究，从回购契约的角度分析供应链的协调问题。 (1)分析零售商与供应商关于批发价格的博弈问题。首先介绍双向报价拍卖机制，分析交易模式。在考虑零售商和供应商的议价能力基础上利用双向报价拍卖机制和不完全信息静态博弈给出每种交易模式下达成的批发价格。然后通过建立的集中决策下和分散决策下的收益模型，分析供应链在分散决策下的弹性收益空间，并根据供应商和零售商对弹性收益空间的贡献比例确定双方的议价能力。最后分析议价能力与其它契约参数的关系。 (2)利用协调理论讨论销售期内零售商降价销售的情形。首先建立集中决策下降价销售的收益模型，讨论供应链最优决策变量。其次建立集中决策下不降价销售时的收益模型，讨论并给出最优决策变量。通过比较分析两种情形下最优决策变量的关系，得出供应链实施降价销售的原因。最后建立分散决策下降价销售时的收益模型，与集中决策下降价销售收益模型比较分析给出此时供应链协调的条件。 (3)利用协调理论讨论零售商努力促销时的供应链协调问题。首先建立集中决策下供应链的收益模型，讨论最优决策变量。其次建立分散决策下无回购契约的收益模型，分析最优决策变量，通过与集中决策下的最优决策变量比较分析得出供应链不能协调的原因。再次建立分散决策下回购契约收益模型，讨论最优决策变量，通过与集中决策下的最优决策变量比较分析得出供应链不能协调的原因。然后建立分散决策下努力成本分担回购契约收益模型，通过此时的最优决策变量与集中决策下的最优决策变量相比，得出契约协调条件。最后考虑努力促销影响市场需求的情形。 (4)将努力促销回购契约模型运用于快速食品供应链协调问题，以此验证模型的可行性与有效性。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economy, the differentiation, personalization and uncertainty of people's demand are becoming more and more obvious. Product technology continues to improve, product update speed is accelerating, product life cycle continues to shorten. In this situation, perishable products came into being and got rapid development. At the same time, economic integration and globalization have intensified the competition among enterprises. The competition among enterprises is gradually transformed into the competition between supply chains, and the coordinated supply chain can make the main bodies in the supply chain achieve the best return state. And enhance the cohesion between enterprises, so as to achieve a win-win or multi-win. For perishable products industry, supply chain management is particularly important because of its product characteristics. Based on this, this paper studies the supply chain of perishable goods, and analyzes the coordination of supply chain from the perspective of repurchase contract. First of all, it introduces the auction mechanism of two-way quotation and analyzes the transaction mode. On the basis of considering the bargaining power of retailers and suppliers, the wholesale price under each transaction mode is given by using the two-way bidding auction mechanism and the static game of incomplete information. Then, the elastic return space of supply chain under decentralized decision is analyzed by establishing the profit model under centralized decision and decentralized decision, and the bargaining power of both parties is determined according to the contribution ratio of supplier and retailer to elastic income space. Finally, the relationship between bargaining power and other contract parameters is analyzed. Firstly, the profit model of sale under centralized decision is established, and the optimal decision variables of supply chain are discussed. Secondly, the income model is established and the optimal decision variables are given. By comparing and analyzing the relationship between the optimal decision variables in the two cases, the reasons for the supply chain to reduce the price of sales are obtained. Finally, the profit model of sale under decentralized decision is established, and the condition of supply chain coordination is given by comparing the profit model of price reduction with that of centralized decision. 3) using coordination theory to discuss the problem of supply chain coordination when retailers try to promote sales. Firstly, the profit model of supply chain under centralized decision is established, and the optimal decision variables are discussed. Secondly, the income model without repurchase contract under decentralized decision is established, and the optimal decision variables are analyzed. By comparing with the optimal decision variables under centralized decision, the reasons why supply chain can not be coordinated are obtained. Thirdly, the repurchase contract income model under decentralized decision is established, and the optimal decision variables are discussed. By comparing with the optimal decision variables under centralized decision, the reasons of supply chain disharmony are obtained. Then the model of effort cost sharing repurchase contract income under decentralized decision is established, and the contract coordination condition is obtained by comparing the optimal decision variable with the optimal decision variable under centralized decision. Finally, considering the situation that hard promotion affects the market demand. 4) apply the repurchase contract model to the coordination problem of fast food supply chain to verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the model.
【学位授予单位】：兰州交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F224;F274

【参考文献】