生产商规模不经济的双渠道供应链协调策略选择

发布时间：2018-06-12 22:52

本文选题：双渠道供应链 + 供应链协调　；参考：《管理科学学报》2017年01期

【摘要】：供应链协调是提高供应链整体利润、改善供应链各方利益的根本手段.旨在探讨生产商具有生产规模不经济特性的双渠道供应链协调策略.给出了集中决策下双渠道供应链的市场价格与整体利润,以及分散决策下批发价契约与收益共享契约的设计方法.提出了协调度的概念,即契约使供应链协调的程度.证明了批发价契约的协调度小于1,不能实现供应链的协调;而收益共享契约的协调度等于1,但相对于批发价契约,收益共享契约不能同时改善零售商和生产商的利润,导致收益共享契约不可实施.为找到双渠道供应链可实施的协调策略,提出了带固定补偿的收益共享契约的设计方法和用纳什讨价还价协商模型确定固定补偿的方法.结果表明,该契约的协调度等于1,并且相对于批发价契约能同时改善零售商和生产商的利润.另外,研究还表明:生产不经济的弹性系数与销售价格成正比、与供应链的整体利润成反比,并且不同渠道间的竞争越激烈,双渠道供应链的销售价格和需求反而越高,双渠道供应链的总利润也越高,并且,带固定补偿的收益共享契约同样可以协调线性成本下的双渠道供应链.最后用算例验证了本文结论的正确性和有效性.
[Abstract]:Supply chain coordination is the fundamental means to increase the overall profit of supply chain and improve the interests of all parties in the supply chain. The aim of this paper is to discuss the coordination strategy of two-channel supply chain with uneconomical production scale. The design method of the market price and the overall profit of the two-channel supply chain under the centralized decision and the wholesale price contract and the profit-sharing contract under the decentralized decision are given. The concept of coordination degree is put forward, that is, the degree of supply chain coordination caused by contract. It is proved that the coordination degree of the wholesale price contract is less than 1, and the coordination degree of the profit sharing contract is equal to 1. However, compared with the wholesale price contract, the profit sharing contract can not improve the profits of both the retailer and the manufacturer at the same time. The result is that the revenue sharing contract cannot be implemented. In order to find out the feasible coordination strategy of double channel supply chain, the design method of revenue sharing contract with fixed compensation and the method of determining fixed compensation by Nash bargaining negotiation model are put forward. The results show that the coordination degree of the contract is equal to 1 and the profit of both retailers and manufacturers can be improved compared with the wholesale price contract. In addition, the study also shows that the elasticity coefficient of uneconomical production is directly proportional to the sales price and inversely proportional to the overall profit of the supply chain, and the more intense the competition between different channels, the higher the sales price and demand of the two-channel supply chain. The higher the total profit of the double-channel supply chain is, the more the revenue-sharing contract with fixed compensation can also coordinate the two-channel supply chain with linear cost. Finally, an example is given to verify the correctness and validity of the conclusion.
【作者单位】：武汉大学经济与管理学院;香港城市大学系统工程与工程管理系;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71231007;71373222)
【分类号】：F274

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