公平偏好下考虑政府补贴的闭环供应链定价与协调

发布时间：2018-06-18 20:55

本文选题：闭环供应链 + 公平偏好　；参考：《重庆交通大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：电子产品更新换代的速度很快,人们在享受科技发展带来福利的同时,也造成数以万计的电子废旧产品的产生,不仅破坏了自然环境,而且造成了资源的浪费。这些废旧的产品本身还有一定的利用价值,为了促进资源的循环使用和保护环境,有必要对电子产品废弃物进行回收再制造。而闭环供应链作为供应链领域一个重要的研究课题,担负起实现回收再制造与发展绿色经济的双重使命。同时政府通过必要的政策手段,在促进企业进行回收再制造的同时实现保护环境的责任。传统的供应链研究往往假设个体是完全理性且自私的,只关注自身的利益最大化而不顾及合作者的利益。但是一系列的行为经济学的实验和研究都证明了在社会交往中的群体不仅仅只是关注自身的利益,往往还表现出一定的社会偏好,现实生活中的个体或者组织是有限理性且具有规避损失、关切公平和厌恶风险等特点。而公平关切,即生活在社会中的个人或集体表达出对别人的关怀。本文根据所研究的内容,以传统的二级闭环供应链模型为基础,首先对公平偏好下的闭环供应链定价策略进行分析与研究,探讨了零售商没有公平偏好、制造商考虑与不考虑零售商公平偏好、制造商与零售商两者都具有公平偏好条件下的闭环供应链双方的定价策略。然后通过引入政府补贴,政府为了促进废旧物品的回收,给予制造商一定的财政补贴,分析了四种不同情形下的定价策略,并将两者的结果进行比较分析,同时通过引入收益费用共享契约对政府补贴情形下的零售商的公平偏好被制造商关注与不被关注时的闭环供应链进行协调,使得供应链各方的收益较分散决策下的收益有所提高,最后利用软件进行数值分析进一步验证了本文的结论。通过各个章节的求值与分析,得出以下主要结论:首先是闭环供应链各个成员的公平偏好行为不仅影响到彼此之间的定价决策与利润分配,同时也会影响供应链的系统利润,且三种不同情形下的影响程度不一样。当零售商关注公平时,制造商观察到其公平偏好行为并主动给予关注将会对自己更加有利而且使得系统利润避免损失;然后,政府给予制造商的单位补贴可以促进废旧产品的回收,同时提高制造商与零售商的收益,最后,通过设计一个收益费用共享契约可以协调政府补贴背景下的闭环供应链,且零售商的公平偏好行为并不会影响协调。与传统的闭环供应链模型相比,本文研究主要针对有无政府补贴在公平偏好的背景下对闭环供应链的定价策略进行了分析并对该闭环供应链实现了协调。研究结果有利于丰富与发展公平偏好在闭环供应链中的应用,具有一定的理论价值。
[Abstract]:Electronic products are changing rapidly. While people enjoy the benefits brought by the development of science and technology, they also cause tens of thousands of electronic waste products, which not only destroy the natural environment, but also lead to the waste of resources. In order to promote the recycling of resources and protect the environment, it is necessary to recycle and remanufacture the waste of electronic products. As an important research topic in the field of supply chain, closed-loop supply chain takes on the dual mission of realizing recycling and remanufacturing and developing green economy. At the same time, the government, through the necessary policy means, promotes the recycling and remanufacturing of enterprises and realizes the responsibility of protecting the environment. Traditional supply chain studies tend to assume that individuals are completely rational and selfish, focusing on maximizing their own interests and ignoring the interests of their collaborators. However, a series of experiments and studies in behavioral economics have proved that the groups in social interaction are not only concerned with their own interests, but also show certain social preferences. In real life, individuals or organizations are bounded rational and have the characteristics of avoiding loss, being concerned about fairness and risk aversion. Equity concerns, that is, individuals or groups living in society, express concern for others. Based on the traditional two-level closed-loop supply chain model, this paper firstly analyzes and studies the closed-loop supply chain pricing strategy under fair preference, and discusses that retailers have no fair preference. Under the condition that the manufacturer and retailer both have fair preference, the pricing strategy of the closed-loop supply chain is considered and not taken into account. Then through the introduction of government subsidies, in order to promote the recovery of waste goods, the government gives certain financial subsidies to manufacturers, analyzes the pricing strategies under four different situations, and compares the results of the two. At the same time, by introducing the revenue-cost sharing contract, the retailer's fair preference in the case of government subsidies is coordinated with the closed-loop supply chain when the manufacturer is concerned with it. The profit of all parties in the supply chain is higher than that under the decentralized decision. Finally, the conclusion of this paper is further verified by the numerical analysis of the software. Through the evaluation and analysis of each chapter, the main conclusions are as follows: firstly, the fair preference behavior of each member of the closed-loop supply chain not only affects the pricing decision and profit distribution among each other, but also affects the system profit of the supply chain. And the degree of influence is different in three different situations. When retailers pay attention to fairness, manufacturers observe that their fair preference behavior and active attention will be more beneficial to themselves and avoid loss of system profits; then, Government unit subsidies to manufacturers can promote recycling of used and end-of-life products, while increasing the profits of manufacturers and retailers. Finally, by designing a revenue-cost sharing contract, the closed-loop supply chain in the context of government subsidies can be coordinated. And the retailer's fair preference behavior will not affect coordination. Compared with the traditional closed-loop supply chain model, this paper mainly analyzes the pricing strategy of the closed-loop supply chain under the background of fairness preference with anarchical subsidy, and realizes the coordination of the closed-loop supply chain. The research results are helpful to enrich and develop the application of fairness preference in closed-loop supply chain and have certain theoretical value.
【学位授予单位】：重庆交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274

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