干扰条件下闭环供应链定价决策及契约协调研究

发布时间：2018-06-27 12:18

本文选题：闭环供应链 + 生产成本　；参考：《机械工程学报》2013年16期

【摘要】：在再制造闭环供应链系统实际运作的过程中,干扰事件是不可避免的,闭环供应链如何有效协调应对干扰事件成为一个研究热点。目前,收益共享契约作为广泛应用的协调机制,更能实现闭环供应链各成员的利润共享和风险分担,为此利用收益共享契约来协调干扰事件。在非线性需求条件下,考虑由单一制造商和零售商组成的闭环供应链系统。通过构建Stackelberg博弈模型,研究当干扰事件引起市场需求、再制造成本、回收成本发生扰动时,在集中和分散化决策下闭环供应链的最优决策。结果表明,干扰事件下原有的收益共享契约不再协调闭环供应链,尤其当市场规模扰动超过规定范围时,应调整生产计划并采用新的收益共享契约,从而达到闭环供应链的协调。通过算例验证了相关结论的有效性。
[Abstract]:In the process of remanufacturing the closed loop supply chain system, the interference event is inevitable. How to effectively coordinate the interference events in the closed-loop supply chain has become a research hotspot. At present, the revenue sharing contract, as a coordination mechanism of extensive application, can realize the profit sharing and risk sharing of the members of the closed loop supply chain. Under the nonlinear demand condition, the closed-loop supply chain system consisting of a single manufacturer and retailer is considered under the condition of nonlinear demand. The Stackelberg game model is constructed to study the closed loop in the centralized and decentralized decision when the market demand, the remanufacturing cost and the recovery cost are disturbed. The results show that the original revenue sharing contract no longer coordinates the closed-loop supply chain under the interference event, especially when the market scale disturbance exceeds the specified scope, the production plan should be adjusted and the new revenue sharing contract should be adopted to achieve the coordination of the closed loop supply chain. The validity of the related conclusions is verified by an example.
【作者单位】：重庆大学机械工程学院;重庆大学科技处;
【基金】：国家软科学研究计划(2009GXQ6D178) 国家社会科学基金(11BGL006)资助项目
【分类号】：F274;F224

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