政府奖惩下闭环供应链的定价与协调研究
发布时间:2018-06-30 02:04
本文选题:闭环供应链 + 政府奖惩 ; 参考:《大连理工大学》2014年硕士论文
【摘要】:随着经济社会的高速发展,人类面临的环境污染、资源稀缺现象愈加严重,为提高资源利用率、实现经济可持续发展,各国政府均采取积极措施推进逆向物流活动,从而促进了闭环供应链管理理论的产生及发展,使其受到了社会各界的广泛关注,并使定量化研究政府对闭环供应链影响的问题成为了研究热点。但已有研究多以政府对制造商再制造活动进行干涉的模型为研究对象,较少考虑政府对零售商废旧品回收活动进行干涉的模型,且对政府干涉下闭环供应链的契约协调问题鲜有研究,为此,本文进行了以下研究: 首先,基于闭环供应链管理相关理论,使用定量化建模方法构建了无政府奖惩下零售商负责回收的集中式和分散式决策闭环供应链模型,并使用博弈论中的K-T条件、逆向归纳法等对其进行求解。通过对比分析指出分散式决策中存在的“双重边际效应”问题,结合闭环供应链定价决策、契约协调相关理论,基于可协调传统供应链的数量折扣契约的协调机理,设计了数量折扣契约用以协调无政府干涉下的分散式决策闭环供应链模型,并运用算例仿真方法进行了数值算例分析,验证了相关结论的正确性。 其次,基于以上无政府奖惩下闭环供应链模型的构建及求解方法,构建求解了政府对零售商实施奖惩的集中式和分散式决策闭环供应链模型,并设计数量折扣契约对分散式决策闭环供应链模型进行了协调,并运用算例仿真方法对以上结果进行了数值算例分析。 最后,通过将无政府奖惩及政府奖惩下各模型的求解结果进行对比分析,指出对于不同范围内的政府奖惩力度和政府设定的最低回收率,随着政府奖惩力度及最低回收率的变化,闭环供应链模型中各决策变量及各成员利润的增减趋势不同。 研究表明,数量折扣契约对无政府奖惩及政府奖惩下的分散式决策闭环供应链均具有较好的协调性。另外,政府对零售商实施奖惩时,只有通过设定合理的最低回收率和奖惩力度,使得政府奖惩下闭环供应链及各成员的利润均高于无政府奖惩下的相应结果,才能对闭环供应链中的各成员产生激励作用,有效促进逆向供应链中的废旧品回收再制造活动,从而提高资源利用率,实现经济社会发展和生态效益获得双赢的目标。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economy and society, the environmental pollution and the scarcity of resources are becoming more and more serious. In order to improve the utilization of resources and realize the sustainable development of economy, the governments of all countries have taken active measures to promote reverse logistics activities. Thus, it promotes the emergence and development of closed-loop supply chain management theory, makes it widely concerned by all walks of life, and makes the quantitative study of government influence on closed-loop supply chain become a research hotspot. However, many studies have focused on the model of government intervention in manufacturers' remanufacturing activities, and less on the model of government intervention in retailers' recycling activities. And the contract coordination of closed-loop supply chain under government intervention is rarely studied. Therefore, this paper makes the following research: firstly, based on the theory of closed-loop supply chain management, In this paper, a centralized and decentralized closed-loop supply chain model of retailers responsible for recovery under anarchic rewards and punishments is constructed by using quantitative modeling method. The K-T condition and reverse induction method are used to solve the model. By comparing and analyzing the problem of "double marginal effect" in decentralized decision making, combined with the pricing decision of closed-loop supply chain and the relevant theory of contract coordination, the coordination mechanism of quantity discount contract in traditional supply chain can be coordinated. The quantity discount contract is designed to coordinate the decentralized decision-making closed-loop supply chain model under anarchic interference. The numerical examples are used to verify the correctness of the relevant conclusions. Secondly, based on the above construction and solution method of closed-loop supply chain model under anarchic reward and punishment, the centralized and decentralized decision-making closed-loop supply chain model of government reward and punishment for retailers is constructed. A quantity discount contract is designed to coordinate the decentralized closed-loop supply chain model, and numerical examples are used to analyze the above results. Finally, through the comparison and analysis of the results of the models under the anarchic rewards and punishments and the government rewards and punishments, it is pointed out that the government rewards and punishments and the minimum recovery rates set by the government are different. With the change of government rewards and penalties and the lowest recovery rate, the trend of each decision variable and the profit of each member in the closed-loop supply chain model is different. The research shows that the quantity discount contract has a good coordination for the decentralized closed-loop supply chain under the anarchic rewards and penalties and the government rewards and punishments. In addition, when the government implements rewards and punishments to retailers, only by setting a reasonable minimum recovery rate and the degree of rewards and punishments, the closed-loop supply chain and the profits of each member under the government rewards and punishments are higher than the corresponding results under the anarchic rewards and punishments. In order to stimulate the members of the closed-loop supply chain, it can effectively promote the recycling and remanufacturing activities of waste products in the reverse supply chain, thus improve the utilization of resources and achieve the goal of win-win for economic and social development and ecological benefits.
【学位授予单位】:大连理工大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F274
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