创新型产品供应网络运营最优控制与清晰联盟博弈协调

发布时间：2018-06-30 07:00

本文选题：创新型产品 + 最优补货控制策略　；参考：《计算机集成制造系统》2013年05期

【摘要】：研究某创新型产品在市场需求随机波动下的运输与库存最优控制策略和多节点库存运输的网络协调。首先以布朗运动描述市场随机累计需求,在满足高服务水平(保证无缺货)的同时考虑常规和紧急两种运输方式及库存补货策略,证明和求解出该产品的单节点和多节点最优库存瞬时控制策略,使得系统长期平均运营成本最小化。采用数值分析和仿真揭示了最优控制策略下单分销商和多分销商系统的运营绩效与各参数之间的变化趋势和敏感性,发现多分销商集中决策相对于分散决策不一定能带来更低的运营成本。以清晰联盟博弈刻画和证明了在补货流和需求流平衡时多分销商分散决策演化为集中运营联合控制后能更有效地协调供应链、降低运营成本,分别证明求解了单产品和多产品情况下清晰联盟博弈核的存在性及其条件,最后给出比例法则和扩充Shapley值两种总体单调分配方案作为该清晰联盟博弈成本分摊的合理预测,并解释了两者差异性的来源。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the optimal control strategy of transportation and inventory and the network coordination of multi-node inventory transportation for an innovative product under the random fluctuation of market demand. Firstly, the Brownian motion is used to describe the random cumulative demand of the market, and to satisfy the high level of service (ensuring that there is no shortage of goods) and to consider the conventional and emergency modes of transportation and inventory restocking strategy at the same time. The single-node and multi-node optimal inventory instantaneous control strategy is proved and solved to minimize the long-term average operating cost of the system. Numerical analysis and simulation are used to reveal the variation trend and sensitivity between the optimal control strategy and the operating performance of the order distributor and multi-distributor system. It is found that centralized decision of multiple distributors does not necessarily bring lower operating cost than decentralized decision. It is proved by clear alliance game that the decentralized decision of multiple distributors can coordinate the supply chain more effectively and reduce the operation cost when the replenishment and demand flow are balanced and the multi-distributor decentralized decision evolves into the centralized operation joint control. It is proved that the existence and conditions of clear alliance game kernels are solved in the case of single product and multi-product respectively. Finally, two total monotone allocation schemes, the proportion rule and the extended Shapley value, are given as the reasonable prediction of the cost allocation of the clear alliance game. And explain the source of the difference between the two.
【作者单位】：天津大学管理与经济学部;武汉理工大学物流学院;清华大学社会科学学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71202086,71072155,71203115)~~
【分类号】：F224.32;F273.2

【参考文献】