供应中断风险下链与链竞争的博弈分析

发布时间：2018-06-30 07:22

本文选题：供应中断 + 供应链竞争　；参考：《重庆大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着经济全球化的发展和市场竞争的日益激烈，企业与企业之间的竞争模式已经转变成供应链与供应链之间的竞争。供应链竞争这种新型的管理运作模式，经过近年的发展，已经取得了比较成功的运用。近年来伴随企业全球化采购、非核心业务外包、单源供应与精益供应等业务模式的发展，供应链在空间上越拉越长，在时间上越来越短，供应链的这种时空变换使得不确定因素增加，加之自然和人为的灾难性事件增多，供应链的不确定性越来越高，范围越来越广，供应链也变得越来越脆弱。本文主要考虑的是供应中断对链与链的竞争造成的影响，在三种不同的情况下，讨论了两条竞争的供应链之间的定价、订货等决策问题。第一种情况是在信息不对称下，即零售商知道自己供应链的全部信息但只了解竞争对手订货量的分布函数，在这种情况下讨论了分别由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的两条供应链之间订货量竞争的问题，对合作竞争博弈、混合竞争博弈、非合作竞争博弈这三种情况下的最优订货量和期望收益进行了分析和求解，讨论了在收益共享契约和奖励-惩罚契约下决策者的选择，可以得出：在给定一条供应链策略的情况下，另一条链中的成员选择合作时，整条链的收益最大。因此供应链成员选择合作对每一个供应链来说都是最优的决策，从长远来看，合作是唯一的均衡。从期望的市场供应量来说，合作竞争博弈给顾客带来的满意度最大，混合竞争博弈次之，非合作竞争博弈最差。因此，合作能够使市场价格更低，使顾客受益更多。第二种情况分析了需求不确定对供应链之间竞争的影响。首先，零售商决定是否与供应商合作；若零售商选择与供应商合作，那么假定他们之间采用收益共享契约，由零售商决定收益共享参数，此时该供应链处于协调状态。若零售商选择不与供应商合作，那么假定他们之间采用批发价格契约，由供应商决定批发价格，此时的供应链处于非协调状态，零售商与供应商之间构成斯坦伯格博弈。在协调竞争、混合竞争、非协调竞争这三种不同的竞争结构下，给出了最优批发价格所满足的条件和两个零售商最优订货量的表达式，，得出了供应可靠性参数和批发价格对最优订货量的影响。研究发现在一定的收益共享系数范围内，供应链协调竞争成立，最后通过数值计算，分析了参数对最优订货量的影响，得到了一些管理启示。第三种情况讨论了突发事件导致的制造成本扰动对供应链上的企业造成的影响，研究了当制造成本产生扰动时，两条供应链之间进行Bertrand博弈的问题，讨论了当成本扰动时，两条供应链的最优定价和订货策略；分析了扰动成本对均衡结果的影响以及在不同参数范围下，两条链的最优调整策略，论文发现只有当扰动成本超过一定的阈值时，两条供应链的订货与定价策略才需要改变，订货与定价策略具有一定的鲁棒性，最后通过数值分析验证了相关结论。
[Abstract]:With the development of economic globalization and the increasingly fierce competition in the market, the competition mode between enterprises and enterprises has changed into competition between supply chain and supply chain. The new management mode of supply chain competition has made a more successful application after recent development. With the development of core business outsourcing, single source supply and lean supply, the longer the supply chain is stretched and shorter in space, the time and space transformation of the supply chain increases the uncertainty, and the increase of natural and man-made catastrophic events, the increasing uncertainty of the supply chain, the wider range of supply chain, and the supply chain. The main consideration is the effect of supply interruption on the chain and chain competition. In three different cases, we discuss the pricing of the two competitive supply chains, order and other decision-making problems.
The first case is that under the information asymmetry, that is, the retailer knows all the information of its supply chain but only understands the distribution function of the quantity of the competitor's order. In this case, we discuss the problem of the competition between two supply chains, which are composed of one supplier and one retailer respectively, the game of cooperative competition, and the mixed competitive Bo. The optimal order quantity and expected return under three cases of non cooperative competition game are analyzed and solved. The choice of decision-makers under the income sharing contract and reward penalty contract is discussed. It can be concluded that in the case of a given supply chain strategy, the whole chain has the greatest benefit when the members of the other chain choose cooperation. Therefore, the selection cooperation of the supply chain is the best decision for each supply chain. In the long run, cooperation is the only equilibrium. From the expected market supply, the cooperative competition game brings the most satisfaction to the customer, the mixed competition game is the second, the non cooperative competition is the worst. Therefore, the cooperation can make the market price more expensive. Low, make the customer benefit more.
In the second case, the influence of demand uncertainty on the competition between supply chains is analyzed. First, the retailer decides whether to cooperate with the supplier. If the retailer chooses to cooperate with the supplier, it is assumed that the retailer adopts the income sharing contract and the retailer decides the income sharing parameter. At this time the supply chain is in a coordinated state. If the retailer chooses the retailer, the retailer is in a coordinated state. If the supplier is not cooperating with the supplier, it is assumed that the wholesale price contract is adopted between them and the supplier determines the wholesale price. The supply chain is in a nonconforming state at this time. The Steinberg game is formed between the retailer and the supplier. The optimal wholesale price is given under the three different competitive structures of coordinated competition, mixed competition and non coordinated competition. The conditions satisfied by the lattice and the expression of the optimal order quantity of the two retailers have obtained the influence of the supply reliability parameters and the wholesale price on the optimal order quantity. The study found that the supply chain is established in the range of the certain income sharing coefficient. Finally, the influence of the parameters on the optimal order quantity is analyzed by numerical calculation. Some management apocalypse.
The third case discusses the impact of the manufacturing cost disturbance caused by the sudden event on the enterprises in the supply chain. The problem of the Bertrand game between two supply chains is studied when the manufacturing cost is disturbed. The optimal pricing and ordering strategy of two supply chains are discussed when the cost disturbance is disturbed, and the disturbance cost pairs are analyzed. The effect of balance results and the optimal adjustment strategy of two chains under different parameters. It is found that only when the cost of the disturbance exceeds a certain threshold, the order and pricing strategy of the two supply chain needs to be changed, and the order and pricing strategy have a certain robustness. Finally, the relevant conclusions are verified by numerical analysis.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274;F224.32

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