基于广告努力水平与价格折扣的供应链合作广告研究

发布时间：2018-07-01 15:24

本文选题：供应链 + 合作广告　；参考：《兰州大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：供应链合作广告作为一种成本分担机制,是供应链渠道协调的一个重要组成部分,它通过供应链成员对广告成本的合理分担来实现对供应链渠道的协调。供应链合作广告包括全国性广告和地方性广告,制造商为强化其品牌知名度在而做全国性广告,零售商则通过地方性广告向消费者提供更详细的产品信息。本文考虑了在市场需求具有价格敏感性的环境下,将单一制造商与单一零售商双方的广告努力水平与成本的关系,以及制造商直接给予消费者一个价格折扣这两种情况引入合作广告模型,建立了非线性需求函数。在此基础之上,研究了四种合作广告博弈模型,首先是经典的制造商为领导者零售商为追随者的Stackelberg博弈模型；其次是针对零售商在市场经济中地位的不断提高,权利也逐渐增大这一现象,探讨了零售商为领导者制造商为追随者的Stackelberg博弈模型；第三是考虑到制造商和零售商权利对等这一关系,分析了Nash均衡下的合作广告；第四是建立了合作博弈,制造商和零售商双方以系统利润最大化来进行合作广告。进而对这四种合作广告博弈模型下的合作广告方案进行对比分析,并以制造商为领导者的Stackelberg博弈为例,将其与合作博弈进行比较,并用帕累托改进对其进行充分的协调,得出制造商和零售商平分供应链额外利润的结论。最后,通过数值分析对上述结果进行了验证。研究结果指出,在制造商或零售商为领导者的Stackelberg博弈模型中,制造商与零售商所投入的广告努力水平及获得的利润大于Nash均衡中的下的广告努力水平及利润,这说明这两种合作广告博弈模型是优于Nash均衡中的合作广告模型的。但是,与其他三种非合作博弈模型相比,充分协调后的合作博弈广告模型是最具有优势的,这种情形下,制造商和零售商平分供应链系统的额外收益,合作博弈下的供应链系统利润最大而且制造商和零售商所投入的广告努力水平也最大。
[Abstract]:As a cost sharing mechanism, cooperative advertising in supply chain is an important part of supply chain channel coordination. It realizes the coordination of supply chain channel through the reasonable sharing of advertising cost among members of supply chain. Supply chain partnerships include national and local advertising, with manufacturers making nationwide ads to enhance their brand awareness, and retailers providing consumers with more detailed product information through local advertising. In this paper, we consider the relationship between the level of advertising effort and the cost of a single manufacturer and a single retailer in a price-sensitive environment. In addition, the cooperative advertising model is introduced in which the manufacturer gives consumers a price discount directly, and the nonlinear demand function is established. On this basis, four kinds of cooperative advertising game models are studied, one is the Stackelberg game model in which the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower, and the other is the increasing status of the retailer in the market economy. This phenomenon is gradually increased, and the Stackelberg game model in which the retailer is the leader manufacturer is discussed. Thirdly, considering the relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer's right equivalence, the cooperative advertising under Nash equilibrium is analyzed. Fourth, a cooperative game is established, in which both manufacturers and retailers maximize the profit of the system to carry out cooperative advertising. Then the cooperative advertising schemes under the four cooperative advertising game models are compared and analyzed, and the Stackelberg game with manufacturer as the leader is taken as an example to compare it with the cooperative game, and to coordinate it fully with the Pareto improvement. The conclusion that manufacturers and retailers divide the extra profit of supply chain equally. Finally, the above results are verified by numerical analysis. The results show that in the Stackelberg game model where the manufacturer or retailer is the leader, the advertising effort and profit of the manufacturer and the retailer are higher than those of the Nash equilibrium. This shows that the two cooperative advertising game models are superior to the cooperative advertising model in Nash equilibrium. However, compared with the other three non-cooperative game models, the fully coordinated cooperative game advertising model is the most advantageous. In this case, manufacturers and retailers share the additional benefits of the supply chain system equally. The profit of supply chain system under cooperative game is the biggest, and the advertising effort of manufacturer and retailer is also the largest.
【学位授予单位】：兰州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274;F713.8

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