基于双渠道零售商的供应链协调策略研究

发布时间：2018-07-03 00:08

本文选题：零售商双渠道 + 供应链协调　；参考：《电子科技大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来,随着电子商务的迅猛发展,不仅涌现出例如天猫、淘宝、京东等专业电商企业,而且传统家电零售巨头苏宁、国美也纷纷开通网络零售渠道,力图在电商行业分一杯羹。与专业电商企业相比,这些传统零售巨头依靠其品牌影响力、覆盖全国范围的零售店面和物流运输线路,形成了强劲的竞争优势。从供应链角度来分析,由于零售商引入网上零售渠道,一方面使市场需求有所增加,从而从制造商处的订货量亦有所增加;另一方面,由于网络运营成本远远低于传统零售成本,其网络定价普遍低于传统渠道(纵使苏宁云商与国美实行线上、线下同价,但零售价仍然远远低于单零售渠道情形),不仅会压低制造商的批发价格,而且对于零售商本身也会由于存在渠道冲突,导致供应链利润有所降低。因此,零售商双渠道供应链的协调与定价问题,得到越来越多国内外学者的普遍关注。基于上述情况,本文建立了由一个制造商和一个供应商组成的二级供应链,其中零售商持有传统零售渠道与网上零售渠道(暂不考虑制造商同时开通网络渠道的情形),分别探讨了收益共享契约、数量折扣契约、二部线性定价契约在消费者需求为线性与随机情形下,能否达到供应链的协调。同时通过数值仿真方法验证各契约参数如何影响供应链利润的分配。由于目前对于零售商双渠道协调策略研究的相关研究比较少,以往对于零售商双渠道的研究基本上是在探讨双渠道零售商的定价均衡策略,本文试图探讨对于传统供应链能够达到协调的供应链契约,能否使的双渠道零售商供应链达到协调。通过模型的推导,本文验证了收益共享契约、数量折扣契约、二部线性定价契约能够使零售商双渠道供应链达到协调。同时,本文也通过斯坦科尔伯格博弈过程的求解,得出了各个模型下的均衡解。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid development of e-commerce, not only professional e-commerce enterprises, such as Tmall, Taobao, JingDong and so on, have emerged, but Su Ning, the traditional home appliance retail giant, and Gome have also opened online retail channels one after another. Try to get a share in the ecommerce industry. Compared with the professional e-commerce enterprises, these traditional retail giants rely on their brand influence, covering the national retail stores and logistics transportation lines, forming a strong competitive advantage. From a supply chain point of view, the introduction of online retail channels by retailers on the one hand increases market demand and thus orders from manufacturers; on the other hand, Because the network operating cost is far lower than the traditional retail cost, its network pricing is generally lower than the traditional channel (even though the Su Ning cloud merchants and Gome implement the same price online and offline, But the retail price is still far lower than the single retail channel), which not only lowers the wholesale price of the manufacturer, but also reduces the profit of the supply chain because of the channel conflict for the retailer itself. Therefore, the coordination and pricing of retailers' double channel supply chain have attracted more and more attention from domestic and foreign scholars. Based on the above situation, a secondary supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a supplier is established. Among them, retailers hold traditional retail channels and online retail channels (not considering the situation that manufacturers open online channels at the same time), and discuss revenue sharing contracts and volume discount contracts, respectively. When the consumer demand is linear and stochastic, the two-part linear pricing contract can achieve the coordination of supply chain. At the same time, the numerical simulation method is used to verify how the contract parameters affect the distribution of supply chain profit. As there are few researches on the coordination strategies of retailers' dual channels, the previous researches on the dual channels of retailers are basically discussing the pricing equilibrium strategies of the retailers with dual channels. This paper attempts to discuss whether the traditional supply chain can achieve the coordination of supply chain contracts, and whether the supply chain of two-channel retailers can achieve coordination. Through the derivation of the model, this paper verifies that the revenue sharing contract, the quantity discount contract and the two linear pricing contracts can make the retailer supply chain coordinate with two channels. At the same time, the equilibrium solution of each model is obtained by solving the game process of Steinkelberg.
【学位授予单位】：电子科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274;F713.32

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