基于前景理论的订单农业供应链的契约选择及协调研究

发布时间：2018-07-12 09:53

本文选题：供应链 + 订单农业　；参考：《华南理工大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文在分析订单农业特点的基础上，，借鉴前景理论构建了单一公司和单一农户组成的“公司+农户”型订单农业供应链的决策模型。通过构建存在缺货时实施一定的惩罚、存在超额时公司分担农户部分的生产成本以及同时实施上述两种契约机制的决策模型，重点考察农产品生产过程中的不确定性(自然随机因素)、市场需求的不确定性(市场随机因素)与农户的损失规避行为等因素对公司与农户决策行为及协调机制的影响，旨在为农户和公司提出更为稳健、可操作的契约机制，以增强订单的稳健性、改善公司与农户的收益。本文首先研究了供应链进行集中决策模式下的最优决策行为。得到供应链集中决策下的最优投入量随着市场零售价格的增加而增加，随着投入成本的增加而减小。其次，本文研究了农户为风险中性者时“公司+农户”型订单农业供应链的契约机制选择问题，分析了了“成本分担”机制、“缺货惩罚”机制以及“成本分担+缺货惩罚”混合机制下农户及公司的最优决策行为，同时探讨了三种契约机制能否实现供应链整体协调的问题。进一步，通过数值分析发现，在特定条件下，成本分担机制可以使得供应链整体达到协调的目的，该契约也满足供应链的各方参与者的绩效都得到改善，即满足公司与农户的收益比没有契约下的绩效水平高的条件。最后考虑了随机产出与随机需求条件下由具有损失规避特性农户与风险中性公司组成的订单农业供应链的激励机制选择问题，将前景理论中的价值函数应用到农户的目标决策函数中，以分析农户的损失规避性对农户及公司的最优决策行为的影响。同时，也分析了在农户具有损失规避特性的决策行为下，三种激励机制对农户与公司决策的影响。结果发现：农户的生产投入量随着其自身损失规避度的增大而增大；相比无契约下，三种激励机制契约均提高了农户的最优投入量对公司订单量的反应系数。进一步，通过数值分析发现，对于具有损失规避行为的农户，成本分担机制、无机制、混合机制都可能是农户与公司的最优契约机制选择，这取决于农户的损失规避程度、产出率与市场需求的波动性。对于供应链整体来讲，这三种契约都很难实现供应链的协调，但在一定条件下，成本分担机制与混合机制有其存在的合理性，使得公司、农户、供应链整体的效用都得到改善，实现供应链的协调。
[Abstract]:On the basis of analyzing the characteristics of order agriculture, this paper constructs a decision model of "company farmer" type of order agricultural supply chain composed of single company and single farmer based on prospect theory. By constructing a decision model to implement the above two contract mechanisms when there is a shortage of goods, the company shares the production cost of the farmer and the above mentioned two kinds of contract mechanism. The influences of uncertainty (natural random factors), market demand uncertainty (market random factors) and farmers' loss avoidance behavior on the decision-making behavior and coordination mechanism of agricultural products are investigated. The purpose of this paper is to put forward a more robust and operable contract mechanism for farmers and companies in order to enhance the robustness of orders and improve the income of companies and farmers. In this paper, the optimal decision-making behavior of supply chain under the mode of centralized decision-making is studied. The results show that the optimal input quantity increases with the increase of retail price and decreases with the increase of input cost. Secondly, this paper studies the choice of contract mechanism of "company farmer" type order agricultural supply chain when farmers are risk-neutral, and analyzes the mechanism of "cost sharing". The optimal decision-making behavior of farmers and companies under the mechanism of "penalty for shortage" and "penalty for shortage of cost sharing" is discussed. At the same time, whether the three kinds of contract mechanisms can realize the overall coordination of supply chain is discussed. Further, through numerical analysis, it is found that under certain conditions, the cost sharing mechanism can make the whole supply chain achieve the purpose of coordination, and the contract can also satisfy the performance of all parties involved in the supply chain improved. That is to say, satisfying the condition that the income of the company and the farmer is higher than the performance level without the contract. Finally, the incentive mechanism selection of order agricultural supply chain is considered under the condition of random output and random demand, which is composed of farmers and risk-neutral companies with loss avoidance characteristics. The value function of foreground theory is applied to the objective decision function of farmers to analyze the influence of the loss avoidance of farmers on the optimal decision-making behavior of farmers and companies. At the same time, the influence of three incentive mechanisms on the decision-making of farmers and companies is also analyzed. The results show that the production input of farmers increases with the increase of their loss avoidance degree, and the three incentive mechanism contracts increase the response coefficient of farmers' optimal input to the amount of company orders compared with those without contracts. Further, through numerical analysis, it is found that for farmers with loss aversion, cost sharing mechanism, no mechanism, mixed mechanism may be the optimal contract mechanism between farmers and companies, which depends on the loss aversion degree of farmers. Rate of output and volatility of market demand. For the supply chain as a whole, these three contracts are difficult to realize the coordination of the supply chain, but under certain conditions, the cost sharing mechanism and the mixed mechanism have their rationality, which makes the utility of the company, farmers, supply chain as a whole improved. Coordinate the supply chain.
【学位授予单位】：华南理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F326.6;F324

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