基于规模不经济和风险规避的链与链竞争纵向合同选择
发布时间：2018-07-16 23:46
【摘要】：随着经济的全球化和科学技术的快速发展,以及市场竞争环境的复杂多变,单个企业之间的竞争已经逐渐演变为供应链间的竞争。在这种竞争环境中,企业必须与纵向合作伙伴建立紧密和谐的协同运作关系才能应对复杂多变的市场环境,提升自身供应链的竞争力,而紧密和谐的协同运作关系本质在于绩效能得到改进。现有的供应链理论虽然通过采用合同改进了整个供应链的绩效,但并不能确保供应链成员绩效均得到改进,更不能保证在链与链竞争的环境中能实现上下游的双赢,特别是当制造商的生产存在生产规模的不经济时、或者零售商对需求风险进行规避时。本文将应用非合作博弈的理论与方法,探索制造商存在规模不经济或零售商对风险进行规避时的纵向合同同时改善制造商和零售商绩效时的条件,识别合同选择的博弈均衡特征,并分析市场竞争强度、制造商的生产规模不经济参数、零售商的风险规避态度等对合同参数设计的影响,为链与链竞争中规模不经济企业和风险规避型企业的纵向合同选择提供理论依据和实践参考价值。首先,本文将基于供应链与供应链进行数量竞争、及其制造商的生产存在的规模不经济的环境,以分散化的批发价格合同或中心化结构为基准,识别复杂合同,如数量折扣合同、纵向联盟与利润分享合同、两部定价合同改善制造商和零售商绩效的双赢机制,探索纵向合同选择的演化路径和占优均衡,并分析规模不经济、竞争强度对合同设计的影响。其结论表明:无论竞争对手供应链采用何种合同,只要本供应链采用复杂合同就可实现上下游绩效改进的双赢。若以中心化结构为基准,则本供应链中的制造商只需设置相对较高的固定收费,即可实现绩效的改进。值得注意的是,若制造商的规模不经济性较弱或者通过技术手段消除了规模不经济,则当横向竞争相对较为激烈时,采用分散化的批发价格合同对制造商和零售商来讲才最有利。其次,基于需求不确定环境和制造商对终端零售价格进行约束的链与链价格竞争环境,分析了竞争供应链分别采用批发价格合同和固定加价合同时的绩效,分别从制造商和零售商绩效均改进的角度、及供应链系统绩效改进的角度识别了固定加价合同的占优均衡,并分析市场波动风险、市场规模、市场份额、竞争强度、零售商预测能力及固定加价比例对博弈均衡的影响。研究结论表明:当横向价格竞争相对较弱,零售商面临的市场份额又较大时,两条竞争性供应链均采用纵向约束的固定加价行为是实现供应链系统绩效改进的占优贝叶斯均衡;若此时固定加价的比例相对适中且市场需求波动风险不是很高,或者固定加价的比例较大但市场需求波动的风险相对适中,则固定加价能实现制造商和零售商双方绩效均改进的双赢,并形成占优均衡和贝叶斯均衡。最后,基于需求不确定环境,构建两个风险中性制造商与两个排他性风险规避零售商组成的链与链价格竞争模型,以批发价格合同为基准,分别识别了采用两部定价合同和收益分享合同实现上下游绩效Pareto均改进的占优均衡特征和局限性,分析需求风险、价格竞争和零售商的风险态度(风险规避或风险中性)对两部定价合同或者收益分享合同参数设置的影响。研究发现两部定价合同的选择并不直接受需求风险的影响,但收益分享合同的选择则受需求波动风险和价格竞争的影响,并且当横向价格竞争较弱,且两部定价合同固定收费设置适中,则两部定价合同是实现上下游绩效改进的占优均衡合同。若横向竞争较弱或适中,且市场需求波动风险相对较小,收益分享比例设置适当,则均提供收益分享合同是上下游双赢的占优均衡。本文的研究结论充分拓展了McGuireStaelin[7]等人的研究成果,弥补了竞争环境下的纵向合同选择方面的不足,也为存在规模不经济和风险规避的供应链在实现链中上下游企业长期合作和发展的双赢局面提供了实施的路径和方法,具有较强的实践价值和理论基础。
[Abstract]:With the globalization of the economy, the rapid development of science and technology, and the complex and changeable market competition environment, the competition among individual enterprises has gradually evolved into the competition between supply chains. In this competitive environment, enterprises must establish close harmony with the longitudinal partners in order to cope with the complex and changeable market ring. The existing supply chain theory can improve the performance of the whole supply chain, but it does not ensure that the performance of the supply chain members can be improved, and it can not be guaranteed in the chain and chain competition environment. A win-win situation between the upper and lower reaches, especially when the production of the manufacturer is uneconomical in production scale, or when the retailer evade the demand risk. This paper will apply the theory and method of non cooperative game to explore the manufacturer and retailer when the manufacturer has an uneconomical scale or a retailer's longitudinal contract to avoid the risk. The conditions of performance, identify the game equilibrium characteristics of the contract selection, and analyze the influence of market competition intensity, the manufacturer's production scale uneconomic parameters, the retailer's risk aversion attitude on the design of the contract parameters, and provide the theoretical basis for the vertical contract selection of the scale uneconomical enterprises and the risk avoidance enterprises in chain and chain competition. First, this article will be based on the quantity competition between supply chain and supply chain, and the uneconomical environment of the manufacturer's production, based on the decentralized wholesale price contract or the centralization structure, identifying the complex contracts, such as the quantity discounts contract, the vertical alliance and the profit sharing contract, and the improvement of the two pricing contracts. The win-win mechanism of manufacturer and retailer performance explores the evolutionary path and dominant equilibrium of vertical contract selection, and analyses the impact of scale uneconomy and competition intensity on contract design. The conclusion shows that, no matter what kind of contract is adopted in the supply chain of competitors, it can achieve both upstream and downstream performance improvement as long as the supply chain uses complex contracts. If the manufacturers in the supply chain have to set relatively high fixed charge to achieve performance improvement, it is worth noting that if the manufacturer's scale is not weak or the scale is uneconomical by means of technical means, when the horizontal competition is relatively fierce, it uses decentralization. The wholesale price contract is the best for the manufacturer and the retailer. Secondly, based on the chain and chain price competition environment that the demand uncertainty environment and the manufacturer constrains the terminal retail price, the performance of the competitive supply chain with the wholesale price contract and the fixed price contract, respectively, is analyzed from the performance of the manufacturer and the retailer, respectively. The angle of improvement, and the performance improvement of the supply chain system, identifies the dominant equilibrium of the fixed pricing contract, and analyzes the influence of market volatility risk, market size, market share, competition intensity, retailer's forecasting ability and fixed price ratio on game equilibrium. The research results show that when the horizontal price competition is relatively weak, the retailer face is relatively weak. When the market share is large, the two competitive supply chain adopts the fixed price fixing behavior of vertical constraint is a dominant Bias equilibrium to improve the performance of the supply chain system. The risk is relatively moderate, and the fixed price increase can achieve a win-win situation of both the manufacturer and the retailer, and form a dominant equilibrium and Bias equilibrium. Finally, based on the uncertainty of the demand environment, the chain and chain price competition model of two risk neutral manufacturers and two exclusive risk averse retailers is constructed, and the wholesale price is combined with the wholesale price. On the same basis, we identify the dominant equilibrium characteristics and limitations of the improvement of both upstream and downstream performance Pareto with two pricing contracts and income sharing contracts, and analyze the impact of demand risk, price competition and risk attitude of retailers (risk avoidance or risk neutral) on the setting of two pricing contracts or income sharing contract parameters. The study found that the choice of the two pricing contracts is not directly affected by the demand risk, but the choice of the income sharing contract is influenced by the demand volatility risk and the price competition, and when the horizontal price competition is weak, and the two fixed pricing contracts are moderate, the two fixed price contract is the superior of the performance improvement of the upstream and downstream. If the horizontal competition is weak or moderate, and the risk of market demand volatility is relatively small and the proportion of income sharing is appropriate, the income sharing contract is a win-win equilibrium between the upstream and downstream. The conclusions of this paper fully expand the research results of McGuireStaelin[7] and others, and make up for the vertical contract selection under the competitive environment. It also provides a way to implement the win-win situation of long-term cooperation and development in the chain of upper and lower reaches of the chain, which has strong practical value and theoretical basis.
【学位授予单位】：电子科技大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274
，
本文编号：2128093
[Abstract]:With the globalization of the economy, the rapid development of science and technology, and the complex and changeable market competition environment, the competition among individual enterprises has gradually evolved into the competition between supply chains. In this competitive environment, enterprises must establish close harmony with the longitudinal partners in order to cope with the complex and changeable market ring. The existing supply chain theory can improve the performance of the whole supply chain, but it does not ensure that the performance of the supply chain members can be improved, and it can not be guaranteed in the chain and chain competition environment. A win-win situation between the upper and lower reaches, especially when the production of the manufacturer is uneconomical in production scale, or when the retailer evade the demand risk. This paper will apply the theory and method of non cooperative game to explore the manufacturer and retailer when the manufacturer has an uneconomical scale or a retailer's longitudinal contract to avoid the risk. The conditions of performance, identify the game equilibrium characteristics of the contract selection, and analyze the influence of market competition intensity, the manufacturer's production scale uneconomic parameters, the retailer's risk aversion attitude on the design of the contract parameters, and provide the theoretical basis for the vertical contract selection of the scale uneconomical enterprises and the risk avoidance enterprises in chain and chain competition. First, this article will be based on the quantity competition between supply chain and supply chain, and the uneconomical environment of the manufacturer's production, based on the decentralized wholesale price contract or the centralization structure, identifying the complex contracts, such as the quantity discounts contract, the vertical alliance and the profit sharing contract, and the improvement of the two pricing contracts. The win-win mechanism of manufacturer and retailer performance explores the evolutionary path and dominant equilibrium of vertical contract selection, and analyses the impact of scale uneconomy and competition intensity on contract design. The conclusion shows that, no matter what kind of contract is adopted in the supply chain of competitors, it can achieve both upstream and downstream performance improvement as long as the supply chain uses complex contracts. If the manufacturers in the supply chain have to set relatively high fixed charge to achieve performance improvement, it is worth noting that if the manufacturer's scale is not weak or the scale is uneconomical by means of technical means, when the horizontal competition is relatively fierce, it uses decentralization. The wholesale price contract is the best for the manufacturer and the retailer. Secondly, based on the chain and chain price competition environment that the demand uncertainty environment and the manufacturer constrains the terminal retail price, the performance of the competitive supply chain with the wholesale price contract and the fixed price contract, respectively, is analyzed from the performance of the manufacturer and the retailer, respectively. The angle of improvement, and the performance improvement of the supply chain system, identifies the dominant equilibrium of the fixed pricing contract, and analyzes the influence of market volatility risk, market size, market share, competition intensity, retailer's forecasting ability and fixed price ratio on game equilibrium. The research results show that when the horizontal price competition is relatively weak, the retailer face is relatively weak. When the market share is large, the two competitive supply chain adopts the fixed price fixing behavior of vertical constraint is a dominant Bias equilibrium to improve the performance of the supply chain system. The risk is relatively moderate, and the fixed price increase can achieve a win-win situation of both the manufacturer and the retailer, and form a dominant equilibrium and Bias equilibrium. Finally, based on the uncertainty of the demand environment, the chain and chain price competition model of two risk neutral manufacturers and two exclusive risk averse retailers is constructed, and the wholesale price is combined with the wholesale price. On the same basis, we identify the dominant equilibrium characteristics and limitations of the improvement of both upstream and downstream performance Pareto with two pricing contracts and income sharing contracts, and analyze the impact of demand risk, price competition and risk attitude of retailers (risk avoidance or risk neutral) on the setting of two pricing contracts or income sharing contract parameters. The study found that the choice of the two pricing contracts is not directly affected by the demand risk, but the choice of the income sharing contract is influenced by the demand volatility risk and the price competition, and when the horizontal price competition is weak, and the two fixed pricing contracts are moderate, the two fixed price contract is the superior of the performance improvement of the upstream and downstream. If the horizontal competition is weak or moderate, and the risk of market demand volatility is relatively small and the proportion of income sharing is appropriate, the income sharing contract is a win-win equilibrium between the upstream and downstream. The conclusions of this paper fully expand the research results of McGuireStaelin[7] and others, and make up for the vertical contract selection under the competitive environment. It also provides a way to implement the win-win situation of long-term cooperation and development in the chain of upper and lower reaches of the chain, which has strong practical value and theoretical basis.
【学位授予单位】：电子科技大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274
，
本文编号：2128093
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