政府干涉下闭环供应链的定价与协调机制研究

发布时间：2018-07-20 20:39

【摘要】：基于国内外闭环供应链管理研究最新进展，针对世界各国环保立法中生产者责任延伸制度的广泛应用，特别是我国颁布了《废弃电器电子产品回收处理管理条例》，鼓励电器电子产品制造者自行或者委托其它市场参与者回收废弃电器电子产品，国家设立废弃电器电子产品处理基金对回收处理进行补贴的现实基础，研究了政府对制造商回收再制造实施奖惩干涉情况下闭环供应链的定价与协调机制等问题。（1）研究了政府干涉下制造商回收竞争的闭环供应链定价决策机制。分别构建了两个制造商都不回收，一个制造商回收、另一个不回收，两个制造商都回收三种情况下的模型，对三种模型进行了比较分析；并对制造商之间的竞争程度、政府奖惩力度和回收节约的成本对竞争决策结果的影响进行了分析；最后进行了算例分析。（2）研究了政府干涉下的闭环供应链回收渠道选择问题。分别构建了政府干涉下制造商回收模型、零售商回收模型、制造商和零售商混合回收模型，对三种模型进行了比较分析；并对政府奖惩力度、回收竞争系数对回收渠道选择的影响进行了分析；最后进行了算例分析。（3）研究了政府干涉下零售商负责回收闭环供应链的定价与协调机制。分别构建了政府干涉前后的分散决策模型，，对模型的销售价格、回收价格和利润进行了比较分析；并以集中决策下的结果作为基准，将收入费用共享契约应用到闭环供应链协调中去，实现了再制造闭环供应链系统的协调；最后进行了算例分析。（4）研究了政府干涉下制造商负责回收的双营销渠道闭环供应链定价与协调机制。分别构建了政府干涉前后的分散决策模型，对模型的销售价格、废旧产品回收率、利润进行了比较分析；以集中决策下的结果作为基准，提出了改进的二部定价契约实现了再制造闭环供应链系统的协调；最后，对系统中主要参数进行了灵敏度分析，并给出了数值算例。（5）研究了政府干涉下第三方负责回收的双营销渠道闭环供应链定价与协调机制。分别构建了政府干涉前后的分散决策模型，对模型的销售价格、废旧产品回收率、利润进行比较分析；并以集中决策下的结果作为基准，提出在制造商和零售商、制造商和第三方回收商之间分别使用改进的二部定价契约实现系统的协调；最后，对系统主要参数进行了灵敏度分析，并给出了数值算例。
[Abstract]:Based on the latest development of closed-loop supply chain management at home and abroad, aiming at the extensive application of the extended producer responsibility system in the environmental protection legislation of various countries in the world, In particular, China has promulgated the regulations on the Administration of Recycling and disposal of waste Electrical and Electronic products, encouraging electrical and electronic product makers to recycle waste electrical and electronic products on their own or by entrusting other market participants. The realistic basis on which the State establishes a fund for the treatment of waste electrical and electronic products to subsidize recycling, This paper studies the pricing and coordination mechanism of the closed-loop supply chain in the case of government reward and punishment intervention on manufacturer recycling and remanufacturing. (1) the closed-loop supply chain pricing decision-making mechanism of manufacturer recovery competition under government intervention is studied. The models of two manufacturers without recycling, one manufacturer recycling, the other non-recycling, two manufacturers recycling three cases are constructed, the three models are compared and analyzed, and the degree of competition between the manufacturers is analyzed. The influence of government reward and punishment and cost saving on the result of competitive decision is analyzed. Finally, a numerical example is given. (2) the selection of recovery channel in closed-loop supply chain under government intervention is studied. The models of manufacturer recovery under government intervention, retailer recovery model, manufacturer and retailer mixed recovery model are constructed, and the three models are compared and analyzed, and the government rewards and punishments are analyzed. The influence of recovery competition coefficient on the selection of recovery channel is analyzed. Finally, an example is given. (3) the pricing and coordination mechanism of retailer responsible for recycling closed-loop supply chain under government intervention is studied. The decentralized decision-making model before and after government intervention is constructed, and the sales price, recovery price and profit of the model are compared and analyzed, and the results of centralized decision-making are taken as the benchmark. The revenue-cost sharing contract is applied to the coordination of the closed-loop supply chain, and the coordination of the remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain system is realized. Finally, an example is given. (4) the closed-loop supply chain pricing and coordination mechanism in which the manufacturer is responsible for recovery under government intervention is studied. The decentralized decision-making model before and after the government intervention is constructed, and the sales price, recovery rate and profit of the model are compared and analyzed, and the results under the centralized decision are taken as the benchmark. An improved two-part pricing contract is proposed to coordinate the remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain system. Finally, the sensitivity of the main parameters in the system is analyzed. A numerical example is given. (5) the pricing and coordination mechanism of the closed-loop supply chain with the third party responsible for recovery under government intervention is studied. The decentralized decision-making model before and after government intervention is constructed, and the sales price, recovery rate and profit of the model are compared and analyzed, and the results under the centralized decision are taken as the benchmark, which is put forward to manufacturers and retailers. The coordination of the system is realized by using the improved two-part pricing contract between the manufacturer and the third-party recycler. Finally, the sensitivity of the main parameters of the system is analyzed, and a numerical example is given.
【学位授予单位】：天津大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274

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