具零售商响应定价的供应链双批发价合同研究

发布时间：2018-07-27 20:24

【摘要】：在供应链中,何时向供应商订货对于零售商来说是很重要的一个问题,在不同的时间点订货,库存风险在两个企业之间的分配也不同。一个双批发价合同包含了在两个不同时间点订货的两个不同批发价：一个是在需求的波动实现之前的订货,即预订货时的批发价；另一个是在需求的波动实现之后的订货,即延迟订货时的批发价。双批发价合同中的两个参数控制着供应链中的订货量和生产量,具体可以分成三种情况：推式合同、拉式合同和部分预订合同。推式合同是指零售商只预订货,而拉式合同是指零售商只延迟订货,部分预订合同则是推式合同和拉式合同的结合。在这篇文章中,作者研究了零售商的响应定价会如何影响供应链合同在推式合同、拉式合同以及部分预订合同之间的选择。零售商的响应定价是指零售商在需求波动实现之后制定零售价,并且零售价会影响最终的需求量。作者用一个两阶段的报童模型为这个问题建模,其目标是最大化两个企业自己的利润。他们的最优订货量决策和最优生产量决策将会确定供应链运行的合同。作者也找到了供应链在各个合同下运行的条件,并且发现在延迟订货的批发价较高时,零售商的定价能力会损伤供应商的生产量,从而导致供应商甚至在批发价上升时降低生产量。通过数值实验,作者分析了需求的价格系数和需求波动性对供应链合同选择的影响。他们指出需求的价格系数表示了零售商定价能力的大小,其实际作用是降低需求的波动性。他们同时也发现在延迟订货的批发价很高时,零售商面对波动更大的需求反而更愿意供应链在推式合同下运行。与没有零售商响应定价的供应链相比,从部分预订合同进入拉式合同时,零售商的预订量不再是连续变化,这是因为定价能力使得零售商即使没有预订则总是愿意销售一些产品。在对供应链效益的分析中,作者发现供应链仅在预订的批发价达到生产成本时达到协作。此外,零售商的响应定价能够提高供应链的效率,在两个批发价都较小时提高程度最大,而在两个批发价都较大时提高程度最小。
[Abstract]:In the supply chain, when to order to the supplier is a very important problem for the retailer, and the distribution of inventory risk between the two enterprises is different at different time points. A double wholesale price contract contains two different wholesale prices for ordering at two different points in time: one is the order before the fluctuation of demand is realized, that is, the wholesale price at the time of ordering, and the other is the order after the fluctuation of demand is realized. The wholesale price at which the order is delayed. The two parameters in the double wholesale price contract control the quantity of order and production in the supply chain, which can be divided into three cases: push contract, pull contract and partial reservation contract. Push contract means that the retailer only orders the goods, while the pull contract means that the retailer only delays the order, and part of the reservation contract is the combination of the push contract and the pull contract. In this paper, the author studies how the retailer's response pricing affects the selection of supply chain contracts between push contracts, pull contracts and partial subscription contracts. The response pricing of retailers means that retailers set retail prices after the demand fluctuation has been realized, and the retail price will affect the final demand. The author uses a two-stage newsboy model to model the problem, the goal of which is to maximize the profits of the two firms themselves. Their optimal order decisions and optimal production decisions will determine the contract for supply chain operations. The author also finds out the conditions under which the supply chain operates under various contracts, and finds that when the wholesale price for delayed orders is higher, the retailer's pricing ability can damage the supplier's output. This causes suppliers to reduce production even as wholesale prices rise. Through numerical experiments, the author analyzes the influence of demand price coefficient and demand volatility on supply chain contract selection. They point out that the price coefficient of demand represents the size of the retailer's pricing power, and its actual effect is to reduce the volatility of demand. They also found that when wholesale prices for late orders were high, retailers were more willing to run supply chains under push contracts in the face of more volatile demand. Compared with supply chains without retailers responding to pricing, when entering pull contracts from partial booking contracts, retailers' bookings are no longer continuously changing. This is because pricing power makes retailers willing to sell products even if they don't have a reservation. In the analysis of the supply chain benefit, the author finds that the supply chain can only cooperate when the wholesale price of the supply chain reaches the production cost. In addition, the response pricing of retailers can improve the efficiency of the supply chain, the maximum increase in both wholesale prices are small, but the least increase in both wholesale prices.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274

【共引文献】