零售商主导型绿色供应链激励机制设计

发布时间：2018-07-28 10:11

【摘要】：以往有关绿色供应链激励机制的研究主要是围绕制造商为核心企业展开.而2014年12月颁布的《企业绿色采购指南(试行)》强调了采购商(或零售商)在绿色供应链当中所起的作用.以零售商(而不是供应商)作为核心企业,建立供应商-零售商绿色供应链博弈模型,用以研究零售商的激励制度设计以及绿色产品需求如何影响绿色供应链.分别求解供应商不进行绿色工艺研发、供应商单独进行绿色工艺研发的供应链均衡解,并且设计了转移支付激励机制.研究表明:1)供应商和零售商不一定都有激励提高产品绿色度,但在特定条件下,他们都有动力提高产品绿色度;2)如果供应商和零售商都有动力提高产品绿色度,那么供应商主导型的绿色供应链比零售商主导型的供应链在为整个供应链创造利润方面更佳;3)零售商主导型的绿色供应链可找到最优转移支付比例使得供应链整体利润最大化,且转移支付激励手段有效.
[Abstract]:In the past, the research on green supply chain incentive mechanism mainly revolved around manufacturers as the core enterprises. The Green Purchasing Guide for Enterprises (trial) issued in December 2014 emphasizes the role of purchasers (or retailers) in green supply chains. Taking retailers (not suppliers) as the core enterprises, the game model of supplier-retailer green supply chain is established to study the incentive system design of retailers and how green product demand affects green supply chain. The supply chain equilibrium solution of supplier without green process research and development is solved, and the incentive mechanism of transfer payment is designed. The study shows that both suppliers and retailers may not have incentives to improve the green degree of their products, but under certain conditions, they all have incentives to improve the green degree of their products. 2) if both suppliers and retailers have incentives to improve the green degree of products, Then the supplier-led green supply chain is better than the retailer-led supply chain in generating profit for the whole supply chain.) the retailer-led green supply chain can find the optimal transfer payment ratio to maximize the overall profit of the supply chain And the incentive means of transfer payment is effective.
【作者单位】：上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目:信息风险评价对信息系统产品供应商及使用者的影响研究(71371121);运营与创新管理(71421002);基于物联网的产品状态智能监控与质量管理(71531010)
【分类号】：F224;F274

【相似文献】