基于EPR制度的政府规制与逆向供应链激励机制
发布时间：2018-07-28 18:02
【摘要】：科技的进步和工业的发展使得再生资源回收再利用逐渐成为世界各国经济持续发展战略的重要举措。企业对废旧产品进行回收再制造,履行生产者延伸责任(EPR)制度,可以有效促进环境保护,提高资源利用率,节约成本,提升竞争优势,从而实现企业的可持续发展。目前,我国消费者环保意识欠缺、废品回收市场无序、企业回收再制造积极性不高,使得政府和企业有效实施逆向供应链系统具有相当的难度。因此,设计合理有效的激励机制来监督管理有关企业至关重要。鉴于此,本文基于EPR制度,运用博弈论、激励理论等知识,研究政府与逆向供应链系统的协调机制,以期得到有益结论为政府和逆向供应链成员提供政策参考和决策支持。本文主要研究内容概述如下。(1)逆向供应链参与企业对废品回收再制造的积极性能有效推动其协调发展。针对一个道德风险和逆向选择并存的逆向供应链系统,利用博弈论和激励理论,分别研究了对称信息和不对称信息下政府和制造商线性契约设计过程,分析了各激励因素对契约的影响,并通过数值仿真探讨了各参数变化对政府、制造商和回收商期望收益的影响。研究表明：委托方设计合理的激励契约能有效甄别代理方的信息,促进企业努力水平,提高政府和企业的期望收益。所得结论对EPR制度下逆向供应链的运营实践有较好的指导意义。(2)基于EPR制度,针对由制造商和回收处理商构成的二级逆向供应链系统,建立了政府与供应链系统博弈的双层规划模型。通过设计制造商对回收处理商的激励契约,探究了供应链成员的最优决策、政府的最优财政策略以及各相关参数对政府和企业决策的影响。研究表明：政府实施合理的环境规制能有效激励制造商提高产品再造率,促进回收处理商提高回收努力水平,增进社会整体福利,保障EPR制度的有效实施。EPR制度下逆向供应链的发展有助于提高资源循环利用,推动静脉产业的可持续发展,实现经济效益和环境效益的双丰收,因此,设计有效的激励机制激励企业提高回收再制造能力具有极其重要的意义。
[Abstract]:With the progress of science and technology and the development of industry, recycling and reuse of renewable resources has gradually become an important measure in the strategy of sustainable economic development of countries all over the world. The recycling and remanufacturing of waste products and the implementation of (EPR) system of extended producer responsibility can effectively promote environmental protection, improve the utilization rate of resources, save costs and enhance competitive advantages, thus realizing the sustainable development of enterprises. At present, the lack of awareness of environmental protection among consumers in China, the disorder of recycling market and the low enthusiasm of enterprises in recycling and remanufacturing make it difficult for the government and enterprises to effectively implement the reverse supply chain system. Therefore, it is very important to design a reasonable and effective incentive mechanism to supervise and manage the relevant enterprises. In view of this, based on the EPR system, using the knowledge of game theory and incentive theory, this paper studies the coordination mechanism between the government and the reverse supply chain system, in order to obtain a useful conclusion for the government and the members of the reverse supply chain to provide policy reference and decision support. The main contents of this paper are summarized as follows: (1) the enthusiasm of reverse supply chain enterprises in recycling and remanufacturing of waste products can effectively promote their coordinated development. Aiming at a reverse supply chain system in which moral hazard and adverse selection coexist, using game theory and incentive theory, this paper studies the process of government and manufacturer linear contract design under symmetric information and asymmetric information, respectively. The influence of various incentive factors on the contract is analyzed, and the influence of various parameters on the expected income of the government, manufacturers and recyclers is discussed by numerical simulation. The research shows that reasonable incentive contract design can effectively identify the information of the agent, promote the level of enterprise efforts, and improve the expected income of the government and enterprises. The conclusions are helpful to the operation of reverse supply chain under EPR system. (2) based on EPR system, this paper aims at the two-level reverse supply chain system, which is composed of manufacturer and recycler. A bilevel programming model of the game between government and supply chain system is established. By designing the incentive contract of the manufacturer to the recycler, this paper probes into the optimal decision of the supply chain member, the optimal financial strategy of the government and the influence of the relevant parameters on the decision of the government and the enterprise. The research shows that reasonable environmental regulation by the government can effectively encourage manufacturers to improve the recycling rate, promote the recyclers to improve the level of recycling efforts, and promote the overall welfare of the society. The development of reverse supply chain under EPR system can help to improve the recycling of resources, promote the sustainable development of venous industry, and realize the double harvest of economic and environmental benefits. It is of great significance to design an effective incentive mechanism to encourage enterprises to improve their ability of recycling and remanufacturing.
【学位授予单位】：浙江工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F270.7;F713.2
本文编号：2151162
[Abstract]:With the progress of science and technology and the development of industry, recycling and reuse of renewable resources has gradually become an important measure in the strategy of sustainable economic development of countries all over the world. The recycling and remanufacturing of waste products and the implementation of (EPR) system of extended producer responsibility can effectively promote environmental protection, improve the utilization rate of resources, save costs and enhance competitive advantages, thus realizing the sustainable development of enterprises. At present, the lack of awareness of environmental protection among consumers in China, the disorder of recycling market and the low enthusiasm of enterprises in recycling and remanufacturing make it difficult for the government and enterprises to effectively implement the reverse supply chain system. Therefore, it is very important to design a reasonable and effective incentive mechanism to supervise and manage the relevant enterprises. In view of this, based on the EPR system, using the knowledge of game theory and incentive theory, this paper studies the coordination mechanism between the government and the reverse supply chain system, in order to obtain a useful conclusion for the government and the members of the reverse supply chain to provide policy reference and decision support. The main contents of this paper are summarized as follows: (1) the enthusiasm of reverse supply chain enterprises in recycling and remanufacturing of waste products can effectively promote their coordinated development. Aiming at a reverse supply chain system in which moral hazard and adverse selection coexist, using game theory and incentive theory, this paper studies the process of government and manufacturer linear contract design under symmetric information and asymmetric information, respectively. The influence of various incentive factors on the contract is analyzed, and the influence of various parameters on the expected income of the government, manufacturers and recyclers is discussed by numerical simulation. The research shows that reasonable incentive contract design can effectively identify the information of the agent, promote the level of enterprise efforts, and improve the expected income of the government and enterprises. The conclusions are helpful to the operation of reverse supply chain under EPR system. (2) based on EPR system, this paper aims at the two-level reverse supply chain system, which is composed of manufacturer and recycler. A bilevel programming model of the game between government and supply chain system is established. By designing the incentive contract of the manufacturer to the recycler, this paper probes into the optimal decision of the supply chain member, the optimal financial strategy of the government and the influence of the relevant parameters on the decision of the government and the enterprise. The research shows that reasonable environmental regulation by the government can effectively encourage manufacturers to improve the recycling rate, promote the recyclers to improve the level of recycling efforts, and promote the overall welfare of the society. The development of reverse supply chain under EPR system can help to improve the recycling of resources, promote the sustainable development of venous industry, and realize the double harvest of economic and environmental benefits. It is of great significance to design an effective incentive mechanism to encourage enterprises to improve their ability of recycling and remanufacturing.
【学位授予单位】：浙江工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F270.7;F713.2
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前2条
1 贡文伟;李虎;葛翠翠;;不对称信息下逆向供应链契约设计[J];工业工程与管理;2011年05期
2 辛玉红;李小莉;;基于SCF的多任务委托代理激励机制[J];工业工程;2013年05期
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