下游企业监督与政府介入对供应商减排影响的分析

发布时间：2018-08-02 12:18

【摘要】：考虑了由一个供应商和一个下游企业组成的供应链,研究了当供应商的生产污染排放会降低消费者对下游企业产品的需求时,下游企业通过监督敦促供应商降低排放,以及政府通过对供应商的生产污染征收惩罚税或对其减排投入进行补贴以达到保护环境目的。将生产污染排放对环境造成的负面影响纳入社会福利计算,通过数值仿真,给出了在消费者环保意识强弱和供应商初始排放程度不同的情况下,企业的利润,生产对环境造成的负面影响和社会福利,以及政府和企业的均衡选择。结果表明,当没有政府介入时,下游企业敦促供应商减排总是能提升下游企业的利润,但会降低供应商的利润,此时只有当下游企业给予供应商超过其利润损失的一定补贴额,供应商与下游企业才会就减排程度达成一致;当政府介入时,多数情况下,政府会选择补贴供应商,而下游企业不会去敦促供应商减排;少数情况下,政府会选择对供应商征税,而下游企业也会敦促供应商减排。
[Abstract]:Considering a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a downstream enterprise, and studying that when the supplier's production pollution emissions reduce consumer demand for downstream enterprise products, downstream firms urge suppliers to reduce emissions through oversight, And the government can protect the environment by imposing penalty tax on the production pollution of suppliers or subsidizing their emission reduction input. The negative effects of production pollution emissions on the environment are incorporated into the social welfare calculation. Through numerical simulation, the profits of the enterprises are given under the condition that the consumers' awareness of environmental protection is different and the initial emission degree of suppliers is different. Negative impact of production on the environment and social welfare, and balanced choice between government and enterprise. The results show that, when there is no government intervention, downstream enterprises urge suppliers to reduce emissions always increase the profits of downstream enterprises, but reduce the profits of suppliers, only when downstream enterprises give suppliers more than a certain amount of subsidies for their loss of profits. Suppliers and downstream firms agree on how much to reduce emissions; when the government steps in, the government chooses to subsidize suppliers in most cases, while downstream firms do not urge suppliers to cut emissions. In a few cases, The government will choose to tax suppliers, and downstream companies will urge suppliers to cut emissions.
【作者单位】：重庆大学经济与工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271225)
【分类号】：F274

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