随机需求下考虑顾客退货的供应链差别回购契约研究

发布时间：2018-08-04 20:04

【摘要】：分散式供应链下各成员企业常常以自身利益最大化为目标进行决策,从而导致整条供应链绩效不能够达到集中式供应链下的最优状态。为消除“双重边际化效应”,供应链主导企业可能会选择供应链契约来协调供应链各成员的行为。因此,对供应链契约协调的研究具有重要的意义。本文针对由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的二级供应链,研究了含有两类产品情形的供应链契约协调问题。其中,两类产品是指销售期末零售商期望剩余产品和顾客无缺陷退货产品。本文的主要研究工作如下。(1)在顾客无缺陷退货率为外生给定、市场需求具有随机性且需求依赖于零售价格的条件下,考虑零售商对顾客无缺陷退货产品需付出一定的处理成本、零售商承担缺货损失,销售期结束后两类产品残值不同；制造商提供退货政策时,其对两类产品进行差别回购且对顾客无缺陷退货产品也需付出处理成本等因素。通过引入扩展的报童模型,采用Stackelberg博弈方法,探讨了制造商提供退货政策下的差别回购契约和基于回馈与惩罚策略的差别回购契约对供应链协调的有效性问题。最后,给出数值算例并对相关参数进行灵敏度分析。研究表明：与集中式供应链最优决策相比,基于回馈与惩罚策略的差别回购契约能够协调供应链；与批发价格契约相比,该联合契约能够降低产品零售价格,增加产品订购量和供应链总利润。(2)在上述研究的基础上,进一步考虑加入零售商提供销售努力水平这一因素,零售商的销售努力水平影响顾客无缺陷退货率,市场需求具有随机性且需求同时依赖于零售价格和零售商的销售努力水平。文章同样探讨了上述契约对供应链协调的有效性问题,并给出数值算例及相关参数的灵敏度分析。研究表明：与集中式供应链最优决策相比,只有基于回馈与惩罚策略的差别回购契约能够协调供应链；与批发价格契约相比,该联合契约能够降低产品零售价格,提高零售商销售努力水平,增加产品订购量和供应链总利润。
[Abstract]:In decentralized supply chain, each member enterprise often makes decision with the goal of maximizing its own interests, which results in the performance of the whole supply chain being unable to reach the optimal state under the centralized supply chain. In order to eliminate the "double marginalization effect", supply chain leading enterprises may choose supply chain contract to coordinate the behavior of supply chain members. Therefore, the study of supply chain contract coordination is of great significance. In this paper, a supply chain contract coordination problem with two types of products is studied for a two-stage supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. Among them, two kinds of products refer to the end-of-sale retailers expect surplus products and customer-free return products. The main research work of this paper is as follows: (1) under the condition that the customer's no-defect return rate is exogenous, the market demand is random and the demand depends on the retail price, the retailer has to pay a certain amount of processing cost to the customer's non-defective return product. The retailer bears the loss of stock and the residual value of the two kinds of products is different after the end of the sales period. When the manufacturer provides the return policy, he has to pay the cost of handling the two kinds of products. By introducing the extended newsboy model and using the Stackelberg game method, this paper discusses the effectiveness of the differential repurchase contract under the manufacturer's return policy and the differential repurchase contract based on the feedback and punishment strategy. Finally, a numerical example is given and sensitivity analysis of related parameters is carried out. The results show that: compared with the centralized supply chain optimal decision, the differentiated repurchase contract based on feedback and punishment strategy can coordinate the supply chain, and compared with the wholesale price contract, the combined contract can reduce the retail price of the product. (2) on the basis of the above research, further consideration is given to adding the retailer's level of sales effort, which affects the customer's rate of non-defective return, and increases the quantity of products ordered and the total profit of the supply chain. (2) on the basis of the above research, we further consider the factor of adding retailers' level of sales effort. Market demand is random and demand depends on both retail price and retailer's sales effort. This paper also discusses the effectiveness of the above contract for supply chain coordination, and gives a numerical example and sensitivity analysis of related parameters. The research shows that compared with centralized supply chain optimal decision, only the differentiated repurchase contract based on feedback and punishment strategy can coordinate the supply chain, and compared with the wholesale price contract, the combined contract can reduce the retail price of the product. Improve the retailers'sales efforts, increase the quantity of products ordered and the total profit of the supply chain.
【学位授予单位】：东北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274

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