基于博弈论的供应链上下游企业策略优化研究

发布时间：2018-08-28 20:30

【摘要】：随着市场经济的不断完善以及信息化所导致的全球性竞争加剧,当今的市场竞争已经不再单单是单个企业之间的相互竞争,而是逐渐演变为供应链之间的相互竞争。任何单个企业的资源和实力都是有限的,“单打独斗”的经营模式已经难以适应日益复杂的市场经济环境,企业之间迫切需要进行更加深入的合作,从而促成了供应链合作伙伴的关系,而协同研发与合作广告是作为协调供应链合作伙伴关系的重要措施。在此背景下,本文设定制造商作为供应链上的一个中心节点企业,运用博弈论的方法,分别研究供应商—制造商在协同研发与制造商—零售商在合作广告机制下的决策,从而得出相应的结论使企业实现利润最大化,提高供应链整体利润。首先从由一个制造商和一个供应商组成的供应链出发,两家企业为了降低成本进行协同合作研发。构建了该情形下两企业协同合作研发的博弈模型,考察制造商补贴供应商的研发活动是否能降低成本,通过模型分析这种研发补贴机制是否能让双方有利可图。最后得出在常数需求下,研发补贴策略不可能被供应商与制造商双方同时接受,任何一方的得利都将成为另一方的损失,亦即为零和博弈；当需求为线性函数时,即可能经由研发补贴的策略来达成非零和的结果,使双方都能获利。然后在制造商与零售商的竞争合作关系下,以三种博弈模型探讨合作广告机制。首先是典型的领导者与跟随者的Stackelberg均衡,其中制造商是领导者,零售商扮演跟随者的角色；其次是同步行动的Nash均衡,即制造商与零售商同时行动但不合作；最后则是讨论Pareto均衡下的广告组合。最后研究发现制造商偏好当领导者,以实现自己的利润最大化,而零售商则要视两方边际报酬的相对大小情况来确定是否要当跟随者。另一方面,如果双方能取得共识,可进行谈判以取得供应链总利润的最大化,达到帕累托均衡。本论文以制造商作为供应链上的一个中心节点企业,基于多种博弈模型研究供应链企业的协同研发与合作广告机制,其结果可作为供应链企业制定决策时的参考。论文研究过程中得出结论是：供应链中的成员企业在制定决策fB,是以自身利益为出发点,追求各自利润的最大化。但这种结果并非是Pareto最优状态。为了实现供应链整体Pareto最优状态,各成员企业应从双赢的观点出发制定市场策略,依托伙伴关系寻求企业连结,增加竞争优势。这样的研究结果,不仅是理性、有效率的,还是最贴近实际商业环境运作的情形。因此,本文研究具有理论价值和现实意义。
[Abstract]:With the continuous improvement of market economy and the aggravation of global competition caused by information technology, the market competition is not only the competition among individual enterprises, but also the competition between supply chains. The resources and strength of any single enterprise are limited, and the business model of "fighting alone" has been difficult to adapt to the increasingly complex market economy environment, and there is an urgent need for more in-depth cooperation among enterprises. Therefore, collaborative research and development and cooperative advertising are important measures to coordinate the supply chain partnership. In this context, this paper sets manufacturers as a central node in the supply chain, using game theory to study the decision of supplier-manufacturer in collaborative R & D and manufacturer-retailer in cooperative advertising mechanism. Therefore, the corresponding conclusion can make the enterprise realize the profit maximization and improve the whole profit of the supply chain. Starting from a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a supplier, the two companies cooperate in R & D in order to reduce costs. In this paper, a game model of cooperative R & D between the two enterprises is constructed to investigate whether the R & D activities of manufacturers subsidize suppliers can reduce the cost, and to analyze whether the R & D subsidy mechanism can make both sides profitable. Finally, it is concluded that under constant demand, R & D subsidy strategy cannot be accepted by both suppliers and manufacturers at the same time, the gain of either side will become the loss of the other side, that is, the zero-sum game, when the demand is a linear function, It is possible to achieve a non-zero-sum result through the strategy of R & D subsidies, so that both sides can benefit. Then, under the competition and cooperation relationship between manufacturer and retailer, the cooperative advertising mechanism is discussed with three game models. Firstly, the typical Stackelberg equilibrium of leader and follower, in which the manufacturer is the leader, the retailer plays the role of follower, the second is the Nash equilibrium of synchronous action, in which the manufacturer and the retailer act simultaneously but do not cooperate. Finally, it discusses the advertising mix under Pareto equilibrium. Finally, it is found that manufacturers prefer to be leaders in order to maximize their profits, while retailers should decide whether to be followers depending on the relative size of the two sides' marginal returns. On the other hand, if the two sides can reach a consensus, they can negotiate to maximize the total profit of the supply chain and achieve Pareto equilibrium. In this paper, the manufacturer is taken as a central node in the supply chain, and the cooperative R & D and cooperative advertising mechanism of the supply chain enterprises are studied based on a variety of game models. The results can be used as a reference for the decision making of the supply chain enterprises. In the process of research, it is concluded that the member enterprises in the supply chain make decisions on fB, with their own interests as the starting point and pursue the maximization of their respective profits. But this result is not the optimal state of Pareto. In order to realize the optimal state of the whole Pareto of supply chain, each member enterprise should formulate the market strategy from the point of view of win-win situation, rely on the partnership to seek the enterprise link and increase the competitive advantage. The results are not only rational, efficient, but also closest to the actual business environment. Therefore, this study has theoretical value and practical significance.
【学位授予单位】：广东工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F274;F224.32

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