闭环供应链的契约协调及其应急管理模型研究

发布时间：2018-09-01 06:13

【摘要】：在生态效益、法规强制、经济效益和社会效益等因素的驱动下,使得考虑废旧品回收再利用的闭环供应链成为了供应链管理领域学术界和企业界共同广泛关注的焦点。同传统供应链一样,实际运营闭环供应链中的企业均是独立决策的个体,它们各自的自私自利行为会产生“双重边际效应”问题,造成系统效益的损失。同时,各类突发事件极易干扰闭环供应链的正常运营,往往会使稳定环境下已制定好的计划变得不再可行,再次造成系统效益的损失。因此,本文在系统分析闭环供应链的契约协调,以及供应链的契约协调应急管理等已有研究成果的基础上,综合运用博弈论、优化理论、机制设计理论、供应链契约协调理论和应急管理理论等理论与方法,研究闭环供应链的契约协调及其应对突发事件干扰的应急管理问题,并分别构建了相应的闭环供应链模型。首先,在不考虑突发事件干扰的稳定环境下,一方面,针对通过宣传的手段以回收率方式回收废旧品的情况,构建了无差别定价闭环供应链的定价模型,并分析了分散式决策闭环供应链中存在的“双重边际效应”问题,进而分别设计了两部收费契约、数量折扣契约和收益费用共享契约用以协调无差别定价分散式决策闭环供应链,提高其运营效益；另一方面,针对利用原材料生产的新产品和利用废旧品生产的再造品存在差别定价的情况,构建了两种产品存在Bertrand竞争关系的差别定价闭环供应链的定价模型,并分析了分散式决策闭环供应链中存在的“双重边际效应”问题,进而分别设计了数量折扣契约和收益共享契约用以协调差别定价分散式决策闭环供应链,提高其运营效益。其次,构建了无差别定价闭环供应链的契约协调应急管理模型。考虑突发事件干扰零售商处产品的最大市场需求规模发生扰动的情况,构建了无差别定价集中式决策闭环供应链应对突发事件干扰的优化决策模型,进而分别改进了稳定环境下设计的两部收费契约、数量折扣契约和收益费用共享契约,以使它们具有应急管理能力,实现了协调突发事件干扰下的无差别定价分散式决策闭环供应链,提高其运营效益的目的。最后,构建了差别定价闭环供应链的契约协调应急管理模型。考虑突发事件分别干扰零售商处新产品和再造品的最大市场需求规模发生扰动,以及制造商处新产品和再造品的生产成本发生扰动等两种情况,构建了两种差别定价集中式决策闭环供应链应对突发事件干扰的优化决策模型,进而分别改进了稳定环境下设计的数量折扣契约和收益共享契约,以使它们具有不同的应急管理能力,实现了协调突发事件干扰市场需求或生产成本发生扰动下的差别定价分散式决策闭环供应链,提高其运营效益的目的。
[Abstract]:Driven by the factors of ecological benefit, law enforcement, economic benefit and social benefit, the closed-loop supply chain, which takes into account the recycling and reuse of waste products, has become the focus of attention in the field of supply chain management. As in the traditional supply chain, the enterprises in the closed-loop supply chain are all independent decision making individuals, their selfishness behavior will produce the "double marginal effect" problem, resulting in the loss of the system benefit. At the same time, all kinds of emergencies are easy to interfere with the normal operation of the closed-loop supply chain, which often make the plan that has been made under the stable environment no longer feasible, and cause the loss of the system benefit again. Therefore, on the basis of systematic analysis of contract coordination of closed-loop supply chain and contract coordination emergency management of supply chain, this paper synthetically applies game theory, optimization theory and mechanism design theory. The contract coordination theory and emergency management theory of supply chain are used to study the contract coordination of closed-loop supply chain and its emergency management to deal with the emergency disturbance, and the corresponding closed-loop supply chain models are constructed respectively. First of all, in the stable environment without considering the disturbance of unexpected events, on the one hand, the pricing model of closed-loop supply chain with no differential pricing is constructed to solve the problem of recycling waste by means of propaganda. The problem of "double marginal effect" in decentralized decision closed loop supply chain is analyzed, and then two pricing contracts are designed. Volume discount contracts and revenue-cost sharing contracts are used to coordinate non-differential pricing decentralized decision-making closed-loop supply chains to improve their operational efficiency; on the other hand, In view of the differential pricing of new products produced by raw materials and recycled products produced by waste products, a pricing model of closed loop supply chain with differential pricing for two kinds of products with Bertrand competition relationship is constructed. The problem of "double marginal effect" in the decentralized decision closed loop supply chain is analyzed, and then the quantity discount contract and the revenue sharing contract are designed to coordinate the differential pricing decentralized decision closed loop supply chain to improve its operating efficiency. Secondly, the contract coordination emergency management model of closed-loop supply chain is constructed. Considering the disturbance of the maximum market demand scale of the products disturbed by the unexpected events, the optimal decision model for the closed-loop supply chain with non-differential pricing to deal with the unexpected disturbance is constructed. Furthermore, two fee contracts, quantity discount contracts and revenue-cost sharing contracts designed in a stable environment are improved to enable them to have emergency management capability. A decentralized closed-loop supply chain with non-differential pricing is realized under the interference of coordinated unexpected events, and its operation efficiency is improved. Finally, the contract coordination emergency management model of differential pricing closed-loop supply chain is constructed. Considering the disturbance of the maximum market demand scale of new products and recycled products by retailers, and the disturbance of production costs of new products and recycled products at manufacturers' premises by unexpected events, In this paper, two optimal decision models of centralized decision making closed-loop supply chain for differential pricing to deal with unexpected disturbance are constructed, and then the quantity discount contract and revenue sharing contract designed under stable environment are improved respectively. In order to make them have different ability of emergency management, the purpose of coordinating unexpected events to interfere with market demand or production cost is realized. The purpose of decentralized decision-making closed-loop supply chain with differential pricing is realized, and its operation benefit is improved.
【学位授予单位】：大连理工大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274

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