两级供应链环境下产品价格和保修期决策问题研究
发布时间：2018-09-01 07:09
【摘要】：对于企业来说，产品保修服务具有两个对立的作用。一方面，保修服务能够起到一个促销的作用，提高企业的声誉，吸引更多的消费者，占领更多的市场份额，从而带来更多的利润。另一方面，保修服务也让企业承担更重的售后负担，支付高额的售后成本。企业在对保修期决策时，必须权衡两方面的作用，联合其他决策变量，有效优化企业的绩效。本文立足于供应链视角，探讨成员企业在供应链环境下的生产\营销决策。具体的研究工作如下： 1、针对市场需求率受产品零售价格和保修期长短影响的情况，利用博弈论，研究了需求受零售价格和保修期影响的两阶段供应链管理。通过建立数学模型分两种情况讨论竞争机制：(1)制造商是Stackelberg领导者，(2)零售商是Stackelberg领导者，制造商和零售商以各自单位时间利润最大为目标分别确定产品的保修期和零售价格。针对这两种情况，求得了最优产品价格和保修期的解析解或联合方程。 2、针对由单个供应商和两个相互竞争制造商组成的两级供应链，其中供应商是领导者，制造商是跟随者，生产两种替代性产品，讨论供应商统一批量价格策略和制造商保修期策略。采用逆序归纳法研究该供应链成员之间的博弈行为。首先，讨论两个制造商之间的博弈行为，得到了保修期最优反应函数和唯一的Nash均衡。然后，讨论供应商的批量价格策略，得到了具体的解析表达式。并采用数值算例，针对两制造商的区别只是市场规模不同的特例，刻画了供应商和制造商的策略和单位时间利润的变化规律。
[Abstract]:For enterprises, product warranty services have two opposing roles. On the one hand, warranty service can play a promotional role, improve the reputation of enterprises, attract more consumers, occupy more market share, thereby bring more profits. On the other hand, warranty service also allows enterprises to bear a heavier after-sale burden, paying high after-sale costs. In the decision of warranty period, enterprises must balance the role of two aspects, combine other decision variables, and effectively optimize the performance of enterprises. Based on the perspective of supply chain, this paper discusses the production / marketing decisions of member enterprises in the supply chain environment. The specific research work is as follows: 1. Aiming at the situation that the market demand rate is influenced by the retail price and the length of warranty, the two-stage supply chain management is studied by using game theory. The competition mechanism is discussed by establishing mathematical models: (1) the manufacturer is the leader of Stackelberg, and (2) the retailer is the leader of Stackelberg. The manufacturer and retailer take the maximum profit per unit time as the goal to determine the warranty period and retail price respectively. For these two cases, the analytical solution or joint equation of the optimal product price and warranty period is obtained. 2. For a two-level supply chain consisting of a single supplier and two competing manufacturers, the supplier is the leader. The manufacturer is the follower, produces two alternative products, discusses the supplier unified batch price policy and the manufacturer guarantee period strategy. The game behavior among the members of the supply chain is studied by inverse order induction method. Firstly, the game behavior between two manufacturers is discussed, and the optimal reaction function of warranty period and the unique Nash equilibrium are obtained. Then, the batch price policy of suppliers is discussed, and the specific analytical expression is obtained. A numerical example is used to describe the strategy of supplier and manufacturer and the rule of change of profit per unit time in view of the difference between the two manufacturers is only a special case of different market size.
【学位授予单位】：渤海大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F224;F274
本文编号：2216479
[Abstract]:For enterprises, product warranty services have two opposing roles. On the one hand, warranty service can play a promotional role, improve the reputation of enterprises, attract more consumers, occupy more market share, thereby bring more profits. On the other hand, warranty service also allows enterprises to bear a heavier after-sale burden, paying high after-sale costs. In the decision of warranty period, enterprises must balance the role of two aspects, combine other decision variables, and effectively optimize the performance of enterprises. Based on the perspective of supply chain, this paper discusses the production / marketing decisions of member enterprises in the supply chain environment. The specific research work is as follows: 1. Aiming at the situation that the market demand rate is influenced by the retail price and the length of warranty, the two-stage supply chain management is studied by using game theory. The competition mechanism is discussed by establishing mathematical models: (1) the manufacturer is the leader of Stackelberg, and (2) the retailer is the leader of Stackelberg. The manufacturer and retailer take the maximum profit per unit time as the goal to determine the warranty period and retail price respectively. For these two cases, the analytical solution or joint equation of the optimal product price and warranty period is obtained. 2. For a two-level supply chain consisting of a single supplier and two competing manufacturers, the supplier is the leader. The manufacturer is the follower, produces two alternative products, discusses the supplier unified batch price policy and the manufacturer guarantee period strategy. The game behavior among the members of the supply chain is studied by inverse order induction method. Firstly, the game behavior between two manufacturers is discussed, and the optimal reaction function of warranty period and the unique Nash equilibrium are obtained. Then, the batch price policy of suppliers is discussed, and the specific analytical expression is obtained. A numerical example is used to describe the strategy of supplier and manufacturer and the rule of change of profit per unit time in view of the difference between the two manufacturers is only a special case of different market size.
【学位授予单位】：渤海大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F224;F274
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